Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?

When price-cap rules determine the structure of prices for a long period, they suffer a credibility problem and introduce an element of risk especially if a firm’s profits are “too large”. Profit sharing may be seen as a device to pre-determine price adjustments and thus to decrease regulatory risk. We analyse the effects of profit sharing on the incentives to invest, using a real option approach. Absent credibility issues, a well designed profit sharing system may be neutral relative to a pure price cap. With regulatory risk, profit sharing is preferable to a pure price-cap one, if it intervenes for high enough profit levels.

An Approach to Security for Unstructured Big Data

Security of Big Data is a huge concern. In a broad sense, Big Data contains two types of data: structured and unstructured. Providing security to unstructured data is more difficult than providing security to structured data. In this paper, we have developed an approach to provide adequate security to unstructured data by considering types of data and their sensitivity levels. We have reviewed the different analytics methods of Big Data to build nodes of different types of data. Each type of data has been classified to provide adequate security and enhance the overhead of the security system. To provide security to a data node, and a security suite has been designed by incorporating different security algorithms. Those security algorithms collectively form a security suite which has been interfaced with the data node. Information on data sensitivity has been collected through a survey. We have shown through several experiments on multiple computer systems with varied configurations that data classification with respect to sensitivity levels enhances the performance of the system. The experimental results show how and in what amount the designed security suite reduces overhead and increases security simultaneously.     

Pollution Abatement Subsidies and the Eco-Industry

This paper considers the combination of pollution taxes and abatement subsidies when some polluting firms procure their abatement goods and services from an oligopolistic eco-industry. The regulator must here cope with two simultaneous price distortions: one that comes from pollution and the other which is caused by the eco-industry’s market power. In this context, we show that taxing emissions while subsidizing polluters’ abatement efforts cannot lead to first-best, but the opposite occurs provided it is the eco-industry’s output which is subsidized. When public transfers also create distortions, welfare can be higher if the regulator uses only an emission tax, but subsidizing abatement suppliers while taxing emissions remains optimal when the eco-industry is concentrated.