Inter-market competition for exchange traded funds

We examine how the different mix of informed and liquidity trading in the market for ETFs affects the nature of inter-market competition. We find that both the characteristics of the securities and the structures of the competing markets jointly determine the nature of inter-market competition. Given the superior execution quality on the ECNs and the low adverse selection costs in the ETF market, anonymous market such as the ECNs, attract both liquidity and informed traders. We also find that markets compete in a subset of ETFs. In addition, we find that quotebased competition is prevalent in the market for ETFs.     

The efficiency of decomposition vs direct solution with implications for the question of decentralized or centralized planning

Conclusion The investigation provides overwhelming evidence that decomposition tends to become increasingly more efficient than direct solution as the number of subproblems becomes greater.Further investigation would be required to obtain a comparable picture of the behaviour of decomposition with respect to an increasing number of variables in the master problem as their range of variation in the present study is rather restricted.It is gratefully acknowledged: that in implementing the decompositional procedure on the computer I have benefitted from Mr. A. C. McKay's advice on matters relating to the computer programmes; also that I enjoyed the pleasant and friendly co-operation of the staff of the computer Centre, University of Birmingham, without which the difficulties involved in carrying out the present task would have been compounded manifold; that Dr. C.-L. Sandblom carefully studied this paper and suggested a number of valuable improvements. Finally, I should like to thank Professor Kronsjö for the encouragement that he has given to me in executing this project and to the research council which made this investigation possible.     

Intended electoral participation in transition countries

This paper examines the determinants of intended electoral participation. We analyze attitudes to both referenda and voting in national elections. Sample survey data are obtained from the Eurobarometer survey of transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The empirical results suggest that intended electoral participation increases with age, income and education. But attitudinal variables are also important and in particular confidence in the free market economy and satisfaction with the general development of the country impact positively on intended electoral participation. Received: Received: April 2003 / Accepted: August 2004, Accepted: Received: April 2003 / Accepted: August 2004, JEL Classification: H26, K42 We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of CERGE-EI. We are also grateful for the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, the journal editor and R. Filer and L. Squires.     

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election. In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium. We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington, Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson, Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Managerial bonding and stock liquidity: An analysis of dual-class firms

Given the decision to create a second class of stock through a dual-class structure, we propose that management is more (less) likely to create a liquid secondary market for both classes of shares the lower (higher) its willingness to tie its personal wealth to firm performance. If market makers recognize this relation, they should assign a higher likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of firms that list both classes of stock and a lower likelihood for firms that list only one class of stock pursuant to recapitalization. Additionally, they should assign a lower likelihood to trades motivated by superior information in shares of IPOs that choose a dual-class structure and list only one class relative to IPOs that remain single-class. Our empirical tests based on IPOS and recaps between 1985 and 1988 provide support for these propositions.     

Ownership structure and golden parachutes: Evidence of credible commitment or incentive alignment?

Using a sample of S & P 500 firms, we find that golden parachutes are associated with concentrated external ownership, less concentrated internal ownership, and non-Delaware incorporation. We find little support that concentrated external owners use golden parachutes as credible commitment devices. The general multivariate results support the incentive alignment hypothesis, and reaffirm the view that golden parachutes are a mechanism used to align managerial and shareholder interests when there is a separation between ownership and control. (JEL G32)     

Ein verallgemeinerter Geburten- und Todesprozeß zur Erklärung der Entwicklung des deutschen Volkseinkommens, 1851–1939

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