What is digital possession and how to study it: a conversation with Russell Belk,Rebecca Mardon,Giana M. Eckhardt,Varala Maraj,Will Odom,Massimo Airoldi,Alessandro Caliandro,Mike Molesworth and Alessandro Gandini

ABSTRACT

The platformisation of digital consumption, means that increasingly many of the things that we call ours – our messages, photos, music, achievements – are entangled in complex socio-technical arrangements which require ongoing market mediation. In this context, refining our understanding of what digital possessions are and how to study them is vital. This requires refocusing research away from existing comparative analyses between digital and material possessions. To do so, we organised an interdisciplinary roundtable discussion with critical marketers and digital media scholars, consumer researchers, digital sociologists and researchers in Human Computer Interaction (HCI) at the 11^th Interpretive Consumer Research Conference held in Lyon in May 2019. The result of that discussion is this curation of comments which deal with theoretical, methodological and critical issues and a bold agenda for future research.     

Women on boards and greenhouse gas emission disclosures

We apply institutional and board capital theory to examine whether women on boards are associated with disclosure and quality of corporate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions related reporting. We examine the research problem in Australia in a period when no requirements existed for listed companies to appoint female directors or to report GHG emissions. This environment allows us to examine the association between women on boards and GHG emissions related disclosure in annual and sustainability reports in a voluntary setting. We find that companies with multiple female directors make GHG emissions related disclosures that are of higher quality.     

Using Organizational Architecture to Lead Change

Effective leadership involves more than developing and communicating the right strategic vision for the company. To encourage employees to carry out the corporate vision, companies must ensure consistency among the following three main components of their organizational architecture: (1) the allocation of decision‐making authority; (2) performance measurement systems; and (3) reward systems. The authors illustrate the application of this framework with the case of Xerox's (eventually) successful attempt to create a customer‐oriented workforce in the 1980s. But a more effective demonstration of the importance of these principles, as the authors go on to suggest, might well be the same company's well‐known failure to harvest the commercial promise of the many inventions by its research group in Palo Alto, one of which became the basis for Steve Jobs' success at Apple. This organizational framework is especially useful for evaluating the likely effects of major corporate initiatives such as “Six Sigma” or the “Balanced Scorecard.” For example, it could be used to help top management determine whether, and under what circumstances, decentralization is likely to improve decision‐making and performance, as well as the changes in the firm's performance management and incentive systems that would be required to make decentralization work. Finally, the authors apply the framework to another important leadership issue: corporate ethics. Since the scandals of the early 2000s and the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley, many, if not most, U.S. companies have issued formal codes of conduct, appointed ethics officers, and instituted training programs in ethics. But a key question for top management is whether the incentives established by the company's organizational architecture reinforce or undermine the code of conduct. Ensuring consistency in organizational design is an important leadership function—one that is critical to encouraging ethical behavior as well as the pursuit of shareholder value.     

What explains the lagged-investment effect?

The best predictor of current investment at the firm level is lagged investment. This lagged-investment effect is empirically more important than the cash-flow and Q effects combined. We show that the specification of investment adjustment costs proposed by Christiano et al. (2005) predicts the presence of a lagged-investment effect and that a generalized version of their model is consistent with the behavior of firm-level data from Compustat.