Coasean bargaining with symmetric delay costs

Delay costs play a role in Coasean bargaining over environmental conflicts when an injunction restricts actions until a settlement is reached. Results from the lab suggest that efficiency remained relatively robust to discrete and increasing marginal delay costs, but declined significantly with nonincreasing marginal delay costs. Bargainers appear to deal with probability and consequences separately rather than in combination as maintained by expected utility theory, and as such, neglect ends over means. How the distribution of wealth is best organized depends on perspective: constrained self-interest best organizes behavior if expected utility is maintained; pure self-interest dominates if we acknowledge the probability–consequence heuristic.     

Singapore—An Asian economic miracle

The island’s rapid industrialisation over the past decade and its development as the main trade and financial centre of South-East Asia, supported by a phenomenal growth in tourism, constitute yet another Asian economic miracle.     

Bayes estimates of distance‐to‐market: transactions costs,cooperatives and milk‐market development in the Ethiopian highlands

Rationalizing non‐participation as a resource deficiency in the household, this paper identifies strategies for milk‐market development in the Ethiopian highlands. The additional amounts of covariates required for positive marketable surplus—‘distances‐to market’—are computed from a model in which production and sales are correlated; sales are left‐censored at some unobserved threshold; production efficiencies are heterogeneous; and the data are in the form of a panel. Incorporating these features into the modeling exercise is important because they are fundamental to the data‐generating environment. There are four reasons. First, because production and sales decisions are enacted within the same household, both decisions are affected by the same exogenous shocks, and production and sales are therefore likely to be correlated. Second, because selling involves time and time is arguably the most important resource available to a subsistence household, the minimum sales amount is not zero but, rather, some unobserved threshold that lies beyond zero. Third, the potential existence of heterogeneous abilities in management, ones that lie latent from the econometrician's perspective, suggest that production efficiencies should be permitted to vary across households. Fourth, we observe a single set of households during multiple visits in a single production year. The results convey clearly that institutional and production innovations alone are insufficient to encourage participation. Market‐precipitating innovation requires complementary inputs, especially improvements in human capital and reductions in risk. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Let the evidence speak again! Financial incentives are more effective than we thought

In this essay, the authors rejoin the debate about financial incentive effectiveness. They (a) briefly review the state of the literature in 1998, (b) highlight new meta‐analytic findings and update conclusions regarding the financial incentives–performance relationship, (c) address the myth that financial incentives erode intrinsic motivation, (d) provide explanations for the presumed failure of financial incentives and (e) offer some concluding thoughts and suggestions for future research.     

Effectiveness of Indecent Language in Advertising on Young Adult Consumer Attitudes and Purchase Intent

This study applies both the Dual Mediation Hypothesis and Schema Congruity Theory to examine the effectiveness of mild controversial advertising executions on young adult consumer cognitions, affect, and behavior. Findings from this study suggest that advertisements featuring mild indecent language result in more positive advertisement attitudes, brand attitudes, and purchase intentions than when decent language is used. Young adult consumers also report more positive advertisement and brand attitudes, and a greater likelihood of purchase when they perceive the advertisement to be congruent with their existing schema, regardless of whether the execution is mildly controversial or noncontroversial in nature. The findings of this study are important to advertisers in the development of effective creative execution techniques.     

The Climate Policy of the European Union

There is now almost universal agreement that climate change, with potentially disastrous consequences, is happening and that it is contributed to by human activities. This Forum is dedicated to the discussion of various aspects of the European Union's climate policy, e.g. the EU's future role in the global effort to combat global warming, the efficiency of its climate strategy, the design of a new rule for sharing the corresponding burdens fairly among member states, and the interrelationships between the Union's climate policies, on the one hand, and its energy and transport policies, on the other. * and member of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU). The author wishes to thank Helen Bicknell (Mainz University of Applied Sciences), Oliver Deke (WBGU) and Jürgen Schmid (ISET, Department of Efficient Energy Conversion at the University of Kassel) for their helpful comments. ** This contribution is based on a Jean Monnet Lecture held at Aarhus University on 19 March 2007. The author would like to thank Harri Kalimo for valuable comments.     

Fiscal federalism,jurisdictional competition,and the size of government

Fiscal federalism is commonly held to reduce the size of government, but how does it do so: through shrinking the welfare state, cutting government consumption, or reducing public investment? This paper examines tax competition under fiscal federalism through the lens of imperfect competition theory, derives new empirical implications from different theories of fiscal federalism, and tests those hypotheses with new variables and data. Cross-national statistical results show that jurisdictional competition under fiscal federalism is associated with reductions in the administrative expense of government but not the size of the welfare state. Moreover, the apparent impact of fiscal federalism with a high degree of jurisdictional competition is larger than that estimated in previous research. Once the models have been appropriately specified, the United States is no longer an outlier among high-income democracies on either government consumption or social spending. Close examination of the data reveals that some fiscally federal systems better approximate a “market-preserving model” and others a “capital-privileging” or “state-corroding” model.     

The Silent Samaritan Syndrome: Why the Whistle Remains Unblown

Whistle blowing programs have been central to numerous government, legislative, and regulatory reform efforts in recent years. To protect investors, corporate boards have instituted numerous measures to promote whistle blowing. Despite significant whistle blowing incentives, few individuals blow the whistle when presented with the opportunity. Instead, individuals often remain fallaciously silent and, in essence, become passive fraudsters themselves. Using the fraud triangle and models of moral behavior, we model and analyze fallacious silence and identify factors that may motivate an individual to rationalize fallacious silence. We use a survey of graduate accounting students to test hypothesized factors that contribute to fallacious silence rationalizations in an academic setting. We find evidence that the ability to rationalize fallacious silence is related to community influences and personal traits such as awareness and moral competence.     

The effect of rankings on honesty in budget reporting

We conduct an experiment to investigate the effect of rankings, which are pervasive in practice, on the honesty of managers’ budget reports, which is important for sound decision making in organizations. Participants in our experiment are ranked in one of four ways: (1) firm profit, (2) own compensation, (3) both firm profit and own compensation, and (4) randomly, which serves as our baseline condition. None of the rankings affect participants’ remuneration. Compared to our baseline (random rankings) setting, where participants indeed exhibit honesty concerns, we find that rankings based on firm profit significantly increase honesty and that rankings based on own compensation significantly decrease honesty. Participants who received both rankings were significantly more honest than participants in the own compensation rankings condition. We did not, however, find significant differences in honesty between the both rankings and firm profit rankings conditions. As such, participants in the both rankings condition seemed to focus more on the firm profit metric than on the financially congruent own compensation metric. We also find that our results are stable across periods, suggesting that the effects of rankings neither increased nor dissipated over time. We discuss the contributions of our study and concomitant findings to accounting research and practice.