Orbital mechanics of south korea's technological development: an examination of the 'gravitational' pushes and pulls

This paper highlights some of the critical challenges faced by Korea, more specifically the Korean government and industry, as it strives to find a stable and secure place in the evolving international division of labour. Changes in two specific areas are discussed: the international technology market-palce and Korea' technology relationships with a number of key economies.     

A random coefficient autoregressive Markov regime switching model for dynamic futures hedging

The random coefficient autoregressive Markov regime switching model (RCARRS) for estimating optimal hedge ratios, which generalizes the random coefficient autoregressive (RCAR) and Markov regime switching (MRS) models, is introduced. RCARRS, RCAR, MRS, BEKK‐GARCH, CC‐GARCH, and OLS are compared with the use of aluminum and lead futures data. RCARRS outperforms all models out‐of‐sample for lead and is second only to BEKK‐GARCH for aluminum in terms of variancereduction point estimates. White's data‐snooping reality check null hypothesis of no superiority is rejected for BEKK‐GARCH and RCARRS for aluminum, but not for lead. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:103–129, 2006     

Improving lattice schemes through bias reduction

Lattice schemes for option pricing, such as tree or grid/partial differential equation (p.d.e.) methods, are usually designed as a discrete version of an underlying continuous model of stock prices. The parameters of such schemes are chosen so that the discrete version “best” matches the continuous one. Only in the limit does the lattice option price model converge to the continuous one. Otherwise, a discretization bias remains. A simple modification of lattice schemes which reduces the discretization bias is proposed. The modification can, in theory, be applied to any lattice scheme. The main idea is to adjust the lattice parameters in such a way that the option price bias, not the stock price bias, is minimized. European options are used, for which the option price bias can be evaluated precisely, as a template to modify and improve American option methods. A numerical study is provided. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:733–757, 2006     

Cross‐country Relative Price Volatility: Effects of Market Structure*

Using annual data on nine manufacturing sectors of 18 OECD countries, the article studies the implications of market structure for cross‐country relative price variability. It is found that, in accordance with predictions from a standard markup pricing model, reductions in market competition, along with increased nominal exchange rate volatility, are associated with greater variability of cross‐country relative prices. The market structure also has similar effects on components of cross‐country relative price variability. The empirical findings are robust to the inclusion of various control variables and alternative sample specifications.     

Global and political strategies in deregulated industries: the asymmetric behaviors of former monopolies

In deregulated industries former monopolies often adopt asymmetric behaviors: these firms impede the entry of foreign competitors in their home market, especially using defensive political strategies, and, at the same time, aggressively develop international strategies in foreign markets. To account for this behavior, I develop a game theoretic model involving three players: the former monopoly, its home government, and the host government of the country into which the firm wants to enter. I show first that there are in fact different asymmetric strategies that former monopolies can use in such a setting, and that a global strategy cannot always be implemented by those firms because of cooperation issues between the two governments. I also study the conditions under which these issues can be solved and show that this can happen only when the firm develops a political strategy that integrates both defensive and offensive activities. Overall, this paper therefore argues that asymmetric strategies are not always adopted to maintain monopoly rents but are also dictated by the nature of the international relationships between the governments involved. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.