Do Foreign Greenfields Outperform Foreign Acquisitions or Vice Versa? An Institutional Perspective

abstract Prior studies of the comparative performance of greenfields and acquisitions have advanced competing arguments, with some arguing that greenfields should outperform acquisitions because acquisitions are costlier to integrate, and others that acquisitions should outperform greenfields because greenfields suffer from a liability of newness. Moreover, while the costs of integration and the liability of newness are at their greatest during a subsidiary's first years, prior studies have tested their competing arguments on samples containing older subsidiaries. We extend these prior studies by (1) developing an institutional theory‐based framework that simultaneously considers the costs of integration and the liability of newness, (2) recognizing that both types of costs vary with the level of subsidiary integration, and (3) focusing on the stage of their life during which subsidiaries predominantly incur these costs. To measure subsidiary performance, we ask managers of Dutch multinationals how their ex ante performance expectations compare to the subsidiary's ex post performance during its first two years. Analysing a sample of 191 foreign subsidiaries and controlling for entry mode self‐selection and other factors, we find that acquisitions outperform greenfields at low and intermediate levels of subsidiary integration, but that greenfields outperform acquisitions at higher integration levels.     

Real-life cost of vitamin K antagonist treatment in patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation in France in 2013

Aims: Data highlighting the cost drivers for non-valvular atrial fibrillation (NVAF) patients in terms of vitamin K antagonist (VKA) treatment and monitoring are lacking in France. This study aimed to evaluate the real-life daily cost of VKA treatment in 2013, in French patients suffering from NVAF.

Methods: This longitudinal observational study was performed using the EGB (Echantillon Généraliste des Bénéficiaires) database, a random sample of the French national insurance (NHI) database, which covers 80% of the population. All adult patients whose first NVAF anticoagulant treatment in 2013 was a VKA were analyzed. Costs were calculated for the duration of follow-up and then divided by the number of days of therapy. The analysis was performed both from the French NHI perspective (amount reimbursed by the NHI) and from a collective perspective.

Results: In this study, 3,254 NVAF patients treated with VKA in 2013 were included, and this sample comprised 52.6% males. The mean daily cost of VKA treatment was €1.13 (±1.18) according to the collective perspective (89.4% of this cost was associated to INR measurement) and €1.05 (±1.16) according to the NHI perspective.

Limitations: As diagnoses associated with procedures are not available in the EGB database, proxies were used, and an algorithm was created to define the AF population.

Conclusions: This analysis is the first to consider an exhaustive spectrum of the costs of VKA treatment in France using EGB data. VKA medication requires exhaustive follow-up, and, thus, associated costs are important. The results of the present study confirmed this close follow-up for VKA patients, making the cost of treatment by VKA nearly 10-times more expensive than the cost of medication itself.     

Can Federal Grants Mitigate Social Competition?

The European economic integration leads to increasing mobilityof factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transferprograms. This article investigates the possibility to achieveby means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocationof factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presenceof factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin(1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferencesfor redistribution. We first investigate a simple process inwhich the federal authority progressively raises the matchinggrants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and alldistricts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfersall around. This process is shown to increase efficiency ofboth production and redistribution. However, it does not guaranteethat all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistributionis attained. Assuming complete information among districts,we derive the willingness of each district to match the contributionof other districts and we show that the aggregate willingnessto pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficientlevel of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factorsare achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for thematching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcomeand guarantee that everyone will gain. (JEL Classification:H23, H70)     

Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare

This paper provides a systematic analysis of fiscal decentralization on the quality of government by studying jointly its effects on electoral discipline and selection, in a setting where, realistically, voters only have limited information about fiscal policy in other jurisdictions, ruling out yardstick competition. Fiscal centralization reduces the extent of electoral discipline, as a corrupt (rent-seeking) incumbent can target good behavior only at a “minimum winning coalition” of regions (selective rent-diversion) in order to retain office, but thus makes it more profitable for bad incumbents to pool with good ones, thus increasing the probability of electoral discipline occurring at all. Voters tend to prefer centralization when politicians are low quality i.e. more likely to be corruptible. Centralization with uniform taxes can dominate both unconstrained centralization and decentralization, explaining why uniform taxes are so widely observed.