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排序方式: 共有10000条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Prof. Dr. L. F. van Muiswinkel 《De Economist》1971,119(2):165-181
Ohne ZusammenfassungRede, uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van gewoon hoogleraar in de faculteit der economische wetenschappen aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam op vrijdag 19 februari 1971. 相似文献
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The goal of universal service has dominated the telecommunications policy landscape for at least the past half century. This policy objective has been promoted with cross subsidies from long-distance telecommunications services to subscribers to local telecommunications service. The economic rationale for these cross subsidies is network externalities. In this paper, we show that: (1) the presence of network externalities, even if substantial in overall magnitude, does not generally justify a subscribership subsidy, even a well-designed one; and (2) the empirical realities of telecommunications markets make it unlikely that subscribership subsidies of any kind will increase social welfare. 相似文献
997.
Edgar L. Feige 《Economic Policy》2000,15(31):473-511
This paper examines the desirability and feasibility of replacing the present system of personal and corporate income, sales, excise, capital gains, import and export duties, gift and estate taxes with a single comprehensive revenue neutral Automated Payment Transaction (APT) tax. In its simplest form, the APT tax consists of a flat tax levied on all transactions. The tax is automatically assessed and collected when transactions are settled through the electronic technology of the banking/payments system. The APT tax introduces progressivity through the tax base since the volume of final payments includes exchanges of titles to property and is therefore more highly skewed than the conventional income or consumption tax base. The wealthy carry out a disproportionate share of total transactions and therefore bear a disproportionate burden of the tax despite its flat rate structure. The automated recording of all APT tax payments by firms and individuals eliminates the need to file tax and information returns and creates a degree of transparency and perceived fairness that induces greater tax compliance. Also, the tax has lower administrative and compliance cost. Like all taxes, the APT tax creates new distortions whose costs must be weighted against the benefits obtained by replacing the current tax system. 相似文献
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A regulated upstream monopolist provides an input to firms in a downstream market. If the monopolist enters the downstream market, a natural concern is that it will act so as to raise its downstream rivals' costs. An offsetting incentive is that a higher downstream price will reduce demand for the input, which reduces the monopolist's profit. Conditions under which one incentive dominates the other are derived. The monopolist may desire to lower its downstream rivals' costs rather than raise them. These findings suggest that regulatory policy towards such downstream entry should not focus exclusively on the ability to discriminate. 相似文献
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This paper proposes a game theoretical approach of internationalnegotiations on transboundary pollution. This approach is distinguished bya discrete time formulation and by a suitable formulation of the localinformation assumption on cost and damage functions: at each stage of thenegotiation, the parties assign the best possible cooperative state, giventhe available information, as an objective for the next stage. It is shownthat the resulting sequences of states converges from a non-cooperativesituation to an international optimum in a finite number of stages.Furthermore, a financial transfer structure is also presented that makesthe desired sequence of states individually rational and stategically stable.The concepts are applied in a numerical simulation of the SO2transboundary pollution problem related to acid rain in Northern Europe. 相似文献
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