The demand for and supply of deposits by credit unions: The Caisses populaires' case

The aim of the study is to explain Quebec major credit union's deposit market by way of intergrating its public demand function with the institution's rate-setting operation. The demand for Caisses' deposits is specified as a dynamic stock adjustment model. On the other hand, the intermediary's rate-setting reduced form is derived from a risk-return portfolio balance model which the managers maximize the expected utility of reserves. The two models are integrated by means of a liability composite rate. Econometric estimates of the integrated model provide us with interesting policy insights. For instance, the Quebecois public views chartered banks' deposits as a weak substitute for Caisses' deposits; it is also more responsive to non-rate arguments, such as loan eligibility or the institution's ethnic appeal. On the supply side, competitive liability rates are more important than returns on assets when the Caisses set its deposit rate. Finally, the impact growth imbalance between loans and deposits is well captured by a flow variable, without infringing on the steady-state determination based on rates.     

Optimal Timing of CCS Policies with Heterogeneous Energy Consumption Sectors

Using the Chakravorty et al. (J Econ Dyn Control 30:2875–2904, 2006) ceiling model, we characterize the optimal consumption paths of three energy resources: dirty oil, which is non-renewable and carbon emitting; clean oil, which is also non-renewable but carbon-free thanks to an abatement technology, and solar energy, which is renewable and carbon-free. The resulting energy-mix can supply the energy needs of two sectors. These sectors differ in the additional abatement cost they have to pay for consuming clean rather than dirty oil, as Sector 1 (industry) can abate its emissions at a lower cost than Sector 2 (transport). We show that it is optimal to begin by fully capturing Sector 1’s emissions before the ceiling is reached. Also, there may be optimal paths along which the capture devices of both sectors must be activated. In this case, Sector’s 1 emissions are fully abated first, before Sector 2 abates partially. Finally, we discuss the way heterogeneity of abatement costs causes sectoral energy price paths to differ.     

Multiple equilibria in a monopoly market with heterogeneous agents and externalities

We explore the effects of social influence in a simple market model in which a large number of agents face a binary choice: to buy/not to buy a single unit of a product at a price posted by a single seller (monopoly market). We consider the case of positive externalities: an agent is more willing to buy if other agents make the same decision. We consider two special cases of heterogeneity in the individuals' decision rules, corresponding in the literature to the Random Utility Models of Thurstone, and of McFadden and Manski. In the first one the heterogeneity fluctuates with time, leading to a standard model in Physics: the Ising model at finite temperature (known as annealed disorder) in a uniform external field. In the second approach the heterogeneity among agents is fixed; in Physics this is a particular case of the quenched disorder model known as a random field Ising model, at zero temperature. We study analytically the equilibrium properties of the market in the limiting case where each agent is influenced by all the others (the mean field limit), and we illustrate some dynamic properties of these models making use of numerical simulations in an Agent based Computational Economics approach. Considering the optimization of the profit by the seller within the case of fixed heterogeneity with global externality, we exhibit a new regime where, if the mean willingness to pay increases and/or the production costs decrease, the seller's optimal strategy jumps from a solution with a high price and a small number of buyers, to another one with a low price and a large number of buyers. This regime, usually modelled with ad hoc bimodal distributions of the idiosyncratic heterogeneity, arises here for general monomodal distributions if the social influence is strong enough.     

To fine or to punish in the late Middle Ages: a time-series analysis of justice administration in Nivelles, 1424-1536

Time-series techniques are used to analyse long-historical data on the budget of the Court of Nivelles (Belgium) in the late Middle Ages. The unidirectional causality from receipts to expenditures supports the idea that this mediaeval system was a finefocused (tax-oriented) control system. However, empirical evidence on the presence of changes in receipt collection around 1520 favours the hypothesis of the decline of the mediaeval, urban-based, tax-oriented system and its transformation into a system based on punishment.     

Monotone evolution of resource allocations

We prove several existence theorems for solutions of multivalued differential equations whose trajectories (a) remain in a subset defined by scarcity constraints, and (b) are monotone with respect to a preordering; we give applications to the problem of allocation of scarce resources.     

Efficient estimation of general dynamic models with a continuum of moment conditions

There are two difficulties with the implementation of the characteristic function-based estimators. First, the optimal instrument yielding the ML efficiency depends on the unknown probability density function. Second, the need to use a large set of moment conditions leads to the singularity of the covariance matrix. We resolve the two problems in the framework of GMM with a continuum of moment conditions. A new optimal instrument relies on the double indexing and, as a result, has a simple exponential form. The singularity problem is addressed via a penalization term. We introduce HAC-type estimators for non-Markov models. A simulated method of moments is proposed for non-analytical cases.     

Regulation of the evolution of the architecture of a network by tensors operating on coalitions of actors

Socio-economic networks, neural networks and genetic networks describe collective phenomena through constraints relating actions of several actors, coalitions of these actors and multilinear connectionist operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. We provide a class of control systems governing the evolution of actions, coalitions and multilinear connectionist operators under which the architecture of the network remains viable. The controls are the “viability multipliers” of the “resource space” in which the constraints are defined. They are involved as “tensor products” of the actions of the coalitions and the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist operators. They are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through the “cost” of the constraints under the viability multiplier regarded as a price.     

A cautious note on the use of panel models to predict financial crises

Panel data framework has often been used to build Early Warning Systems for financial crises. This paper questions the implicit assumption that crises are homogenously caused by identical factors. It suggests a preliminary step aiming at forming optimal country clusters.