Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

We report the results of an artefactual field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Second-mover behavior in our sequential prisoner's dilemma allows us to characterize the cooperativeness of our participants. Among messengers, we find that employees at firms that pay for performance are significantly less cooperative than those at firms that pay hourly wages or who are members of cooperatives. To examine whether the difference is the result of treatment or selection we exploit the fact that firm type is location-specific in Switzerland and that entering messengers must work in performance pay firms in the U.S.     

Capitalism's growth imperative

A capitalist firm operating in a competitive market is subjectto a growth imperative, because uncertainty about the profitrate under a no-growth policy makes the firm's prospects highlyunattractive in finite time and bankruptcy practically certainin the long run. A no-growth policy determines consumption andinvestment so that they and capital would remain constant overtime if the latter's expected return were realised with certainty.Simulation is used to arrive at the probability of bankruptcyby the end of t periods and the expected values of capital andmoney, for relevant combinations of time and uncertainty undersuccessively more realistic models of a no-growth firm in acompetitive market. The sensitivity of the results to variationin the parameters in each of the models is evaluated. Finally,we establish that a plausible growth policy may achieve growth,but the problem of bankruptcy is not resolved.     

Disclosure policy: A discussion of Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2008) on “going dark”

LTW (2008) examine firms withdrawing from the SEC reporting system but continuing to trade on Pink Sheets. The paper finds that Sarbanes-Oxley increased the propensity of firms to go dark but, counter to conventional wisdom, had no significant effect on the rate of going-private transactions. Agency costs, as well as poor growth opportunities, proximity to financial distress, and increased compliance costs arising from SOX increase the propensity to go dark. Suggestions to improve the empirical implementation and interpretation involve including additional control and more suitable explanatory variables, and more attention to causation issues and to the quantification of economic significance.     

Institutional underperformance: Should managers listen to the sell-side before trading?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This study examines the performance of institutional trades in the context of recent analyst recommendation changes. We report several findings....     

REINVENTING A CORPORATION: THE SATELLITE STRUCTURE OF THERMO ELECTRON

Thermo Electron has created a unique–and highly productive—corporate structure by selling to the public minority equity interests in 19 of its business units over the period 1983 to 1996. Since 1983, the company has achieved extraordinary gains for stockholders, both those of the parent company and those of most of its publicly traded subsidiaries.
The company's satellite structure is intended to preserve the benefits enjoyed by small entrepreneurial organizations without sacrificing many of the advantages enjoyed by larger firms. Although decentralization is a key element of the organizational design, another important feature of the Thermo Electron approach is that administrative activities unrelated to the focus of the unit's operations continue to be managed at the parent level. The combination of an entrepreneurial atmosphere with the financial and administrative support of a larger organization is used extensively by the company to attract and retain management and technical talent. In fact, the company made the remarkable claim in a 1995 Forbes article that no developer or entrepreneur has ever left Thermo Electron.
Another major contributor to the company's entrepreneurial culture is an incentive structure that is tied directly to the equity performance of both the public units and the parent. Managers of the publicly traded units are granted significant amounts of stock options, but only 40% of those options are based on the performance of their subsidiary. Of the remaining 60%, 40% are granted in the stock of the parent and the other 20% are in stock of the other subsidiaries.     

何时联盟？何时并购？

联合与并购同样是战略选择,这意味着如果选择其中一种战略就得放弃另外一种。如果公司在决策中正确地应用战略选择,他们将会取得更好的业绩。