Was sind Marken wirklich wert?

Wenn Produkte und Services immer vergleichbarer werden, wird die Marke zu einem immer wichtigeren Differenzierungsfaktor. Diese Entwicklung trifft viele Branchen — Telekommunikation, Energieversorgung, Automobilindustrie — insbesondere aber die Banken. Um die Angebote und Preise optimal zu strukturieren, ist eine genaue Kenntnis der kundenindividuellen Markenmehrwerte unerl?sslich. Das im Folgenden beschriebene Vorgehen erl?utert, wie durch eine am individuellen Kunden ausgerichtete, computerbasierte Trade-Off-Analyse der Mehrwert einer Marke und dessen Treiber exakt bestimmt werden k?nnen. Basierend auf diesen Informationen liefern die Autoren Vorschl?ge zur Bildung von Kundensegmenten und zur Implementierung der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse in der Front-Organisation.     

Non-parametric estimation of operational risk losses adjusted for under-reporting

Not all claims are reported when a database for financial operational risk is created. The probability of reporting increases with the size of the operational risk loss, and converges towards one for big losses. Losses in operational risk have different causes, and usually follow a wide variety of distributional shapes. Therefore, a method for modelling operational risk based on one or two parametric models is deemed to fail. In this paper, we introduce a semi-parametric method for modelling operational risk that is capable of taking under-reporting into account and being guided by prior knowledge of the distributional shape.     

Legitimationsdefizite und Kompetenzen der EIOPA im Lichte der Meroni-Rechtsprechung

The establishment of the European (Financial) Supervisory Authorities (ESA) represents a new peak in the process of agencification of the administration of the European Union. The European legislator has granted the newly founded European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) numerous far-reaching powers in relation to national supervisory authorities and market participants. In this regard the question arises if the European Union was duly empowered by primary law to found this supervisory authority. It has, hitherto, also remained unclear if the extent of the powers entrusted to EIOPA is in conformity with other founding principles of European primary law and the case law of the ECJ.     

Framing Effects in Stock Market Forecasts: The Difference Between Asking for Prices and Asking for Returns

Studies analyzing return expectations of financial market participantslike fund managers, CFOs or individual investors are highlyinfluential in academia and practice. We argue and show thatthe results in these surveys above are easily influenced bythe elicitation mode of return expectations. Surveys that askfor future stock price levels are more likely to produce meanreverting expectations than surveys that directly ask for futurereturns. Furthermore, we conduct a questionnaire study thatexplicitly analyzes whether the specific elicitation mode affectsreturn expectations in the above direction. In our study, subjectswere asked to state mean forecasts for seven time series. Usinga between subject design, one half of the subjects was askedto state future price levels, the other group was directly askedfor returns. We observe a highly significant framing effect.For upward sloping time series, the return forecasts statedby investors in the return forecast mode are significantly higherthan those derived for investors in the price forecast mode.For downward sloping time series, the return forecasts givenby investors in the return forecast mode are significantly lowerthan those derived for investors in the price forecast mode.We argue that this finding is consistent with behavioral theoriesof investor expectation formation based on the representativenessheuristic.     

Bundling in banking — A powerful strategy to increase profits

Banks can learn valuable lessons from the bundling models developed successfully in other industries. Bundling core banking products with additional services allows banks to differentiate themselves in a generally homogenous sector. Bundling also increases sales across product areas and aids customer lock-in. This paper provides an overview of how to create attractive and profitable bundles through a systematic, multi-stage approach to customer segmentation, targeting and product positioning.     

A Unifying Framework and Comparison of Algorithms for Non-negative Matrix Factorisation

Non-negative matrix factorisation (NMF) is an increasingly popular unsupervised learning method. However, parameter estimation in the NMF model is a difficult high-dimensional optimisation problem. We consider algorithms of the alternating least squares type. Solutions to the least squares problem fall in two categories. The first category is iterative algorithms, which include algorithms such as the majorise–minimise (MM) algorithm, coordinate descent, gradient descent and the Févotte-Cemgil expectation–maximisation (FC-EM) algorithm. We introduce a new family of iterative updates based on a generalisation of the FC-EM algorithm. The coordinate descent, gradient descent and FC-EM algorithms are special cases of this new EM family of iterative procedures. Curiously, we show that the MM algorithm is never a member of our general EM algorithm. The second category is based on cone projection. We describe and prove a cone projection algorithm tailored to the non-negative least square problem. We compare the algorithms on a test case and on the problem of identifying mutational signatures in human cancer. We generally find that cone projection is an attractive choice. Furthermore, in the cancer application, we find that a mix-and-match strategy performs better than running each algorithm in isolation.     

Dissertation abstract: Voting in the laboratory

Almost every week national elections are held somewhere in the world. Many more elections take place at federal and local levels of government. Surely, these are important events to many of us. This thesis aims at providing a better understanding of why and how people vote in elections. Three original modifications of Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1983) participation game are used to study voter turnout theoretically and experimentally.¹ In the basic game, each voter supports (i.e., prefers) one of two exogenous candidates and privately decides between voting at a cost and abstaining (without costs). The candidate who receives more votes wins the election (ties are broken randomly) and each supporter of this candidate receives an equal reward, independent of whether or not she voted. The first study (published in the American Political Science Review 100, pp. 235–248) analyzes the effects of social embeddedness on turnout, assuming that voters may be influenced by observing the decisions of other voters around them (e.g., a family or working place). Our experimental results show that the social context matters: this information increases turnout by more than 50%. The increase is greater when neighbors support the same candidate rather than when they support opponents. The second study investigates the effects of public opinion polls on voter turnout and welfare. Poll releases resolve uncertainty about the level of support for each candidate caused by `floating’ voters, whose preferences change across elections. This information increases turnout in the laboratory by 28–34%, depending on the fraction of floating voters in the electorate. If polls indicate equal levels of support for both candidates—in which case aggregate benefits for society are not affected by the outcome—welfare decreases substantially due to costs from excessive turnout. In the final study, elections are preceded by the competition between two candidates: they simultaneously announce binding policy offers in which some voters can be favored at the expense of others through inclusion and exclusion in budget expenditure (Myerson 1993).² We observe that policy offers include 33% more voters—yielding a smaller budget share for each—when voting is compulsory rather than voluntary. Moreover, we find evidence of political bonds between voters and long-lived parties. Overall, in all three experiments many subjects strongly react to economic incentives (i.e., benefits, costs, and informational clues), often in line with what is observed outside of the laboratory. JEL Classification C72, C92, D72 Dissertation Committee: Arthur Schram, University of Amsterdam (advisor) Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne Thomas Palfrey, California Institute of Technology Cees van der Eijk, University of Nottingham Frans van Winden, University of Amsterdam ¹Palfrey, T.R., & Rosenthal, H. (1983). A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice, 41, 7–53. ²Myerson, R.B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. American Political Science Review, 87, 856–869.