Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”

In recent debates on environmental problems and policies, the strategy of “degrowth” has appeared as an alternative to the paradigm of economic growth. This new notion is critically evaluated by considering five common interpretations of it. One conclusion is that these multiple interpretations make it an ambiguous and rather confusing concept. Another is that degrowth may not be an effective, let alone an efficient strategy to reduce environmental pressure. It is subsequently argued that “a-growth,” i.e. being indifferent about growth, is a more logical social aim to substitute for the current goal of economic growth, given that GDP (per capita) is a very imperfect indicator of social welfare. In addition, focusing ex ante on public policy is considered to be a strategy which ultimately is more likely to obtain the necessary democratic-political support than an ex ante, explicit degrowth strategy. In line with this, a policy package is proposed which consists of six elements, some of which relate to concerns raised by degrowth supporters.     

What does it mean to find the face of the franchise? Physical attractiveness and the evaluation of athletic performance

We show that attractiveness, as measured by facial symmetry, leads to greater rewards in professional sports. National Football League quarterbacks who are more attractive are paid greater salaries and this premium persists after controlling for player performance.     

Specifications of Social Welfare in Economic Studies of Climate Policy: Overview of Criteria and Related Policy Insights

An important assumption in economic studies of climate policy is the social welfare function. This paper shows that applying distinct decision or social welfare criteria can result in different optimal policies of climate control, notably if climate change impacts are uncertain. First, decision criteria in current climate-economic studies are reviewed. Next, the most important alternatives are discussed, including their (mathematical) formalization and incorporation in economy-climate models. Most of these alternative criteria suggest more stringent climate policies to be optimal than the standard discounted utilitarianism approach. However, several important welfare criteria have not or hardly seen any application in the economic analysis of climate policy. We conclude that there is clear need for systematic research on this theme, for which the current review provides a solid basis.     

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest average payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.      

Towards a kernel theory of external knowledge integration for high-tech firms: Exploring a failed theory test

Designing information systems (ISs) requires a thorough understanding of the organizational knowledge processes in which these systems are used. Although much is known about internal organizational knowledge processes, the understanding of external knowledge processes is less developed. Hence, this paper reflects an attempt to operationalize and test a model of the process of external knowledge integration (EKI), consisting of an identification, acquisition, and utilization stage. We utilize high-technology based firms from a variety of high-tech categories including nanotechnology based firms since these firms have critical knowledge integration needs. The results of an international survey, with responses of 317 high-tech companies, suggest that not these three EKI-stages, but four organizational effectiveness functions (goal attainment, pattern maintenance, adaptation, and integration) account for most variation in responses. These findings seem to imply that ISs that are to support the EKI-process should be designed according to organizational effectiveness functions rather than to EKI-stages. It is proposed that each organizational effectiveness function imposes different requirements on ISs because users interact differently with IS in each function.     

The impact of rural roads and irrigation on household welfare: evidence from Vietnam

We measure the impact of road and irrigation projects on the livelihoods of households in the poorest and most remote areas of Vietnam using difference-in-difference estimators. We find that both rural road and irrigation projects help local households improve the access to safe water and welfare measured by a wealth index. The impact of irrigation projects is found to be larger than the impact of road projects. We also find heterogeneous impacts of road and irrigation projects. Households with higher levels of education tend to benefit more from road projects, while households with lower levels of education are likely to benefit more from irrigation projects.     

Author Index Volume 24 2003

Authors Index

Author Index Volume 24 2003     

A new proof of the maximum principle

Summary. We offer a new proof of the maximum principle, by using the envelope theorem that is frequently used in the standard microeconomic theory. Received: April 11, 2002; revised version: June 26, 2002 Correspondence to: K. Shimomura     

Evolution of harvesting strategies: replicator and resource dynamics

Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run. Correspondence to: J. Noailly     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van