Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability*

Whether natural resources are good or bad for a country's development are shown to depend on the interaction between institutional setting and, crucially, the types of resources possessed by the country. Some natural resources are, for economical and technical reasons, more likely to cause problems such as rent‐seeking and conflicts than others. This potential problem can, however, be countered by good institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis, we show the impact of natural resources on economic growth to be non‐monotonic in institutional quality, and increasingly so for certain types of resources. In particular, countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low‐quality institutions, while the curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good. Furthermore, if countries are rich in diamonds and precious metals, these effects—both positive and negative—are larger.     

Perspective on models in theoretical and practical traditions of knowledge: the example of Otto engine animations

Nineteen informants (n?=?19) were asked to study and comment two computer animations of the Otto combustion engine. One animation was non-interactive and realistic in the sense of depicting a physical engine. The other animation was more idealised, interactive and synchronised with a dynamic PV-graph. The informants represented practical and theoretical traditions of knowledge: science students and teachers at upper secondary school level; vocational students and teachers in vehicle mechanics at upper secondary school level, and; MSc and PhD students in vehicle system engineering. The aim was to explore how they interpreted the animations against the background of their different traditions of knowledge and their experience of physical engines and models of engines. A key finding was that the PhD students saw the interactive animation as a familiar and useful model of engines, whereas the vehicle mechanics teachers saw it as a poor representation of reality. A general conclusion was that there is a variety of competent ways to interpret a model, depending on the tradition of knowledge.     

Bayesian estimation of an open economy DSGE model with incomplete pass-through

In this paper, we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for an open economy, and estimate it on Euro area data using Bayesian estimation techniques. The model incorporates several open economy features, as well as a number of nominal and real frictions that have proven to be important for the empirical fit of closed economy models. The paper offers: i) a theoretical development of the standard DSGE model into an open economy setting, ii) Bayesian estimation of the model, including assessments of the relative importance of various shocks and frictions for explaining the dynamic development of an open economy, and iii) an evaluation of the model's empirical properties using standard validation methods.     

Wealth Concentration over the Path of Development: Sweden, 1873–2006*

We study wealth concentration in Sweden over 130 years, from the beginning of industrialization until the present day. Our series are based on new evidence from estate and wealth tax data, foreign and domestic family firm‐wealth, and pension wealth estimates. We find that Swedish wealth concentration was high in the agrarian state, and changed little during early industrialization. From World War I until about 1950, the richest percentile lost ground to high‐income earners in the rest of the top‐wealth decile. This equalization continued postwar; the entire top decile lost‐out relative to the rest of the population. Around 1980, wealth compression stopped and inequality increased. We approximate the effects of international flows and find that the recent increase in wealth inequality is probably larger than what official estimates suggest.     

Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay‐to‐performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a stronger pay‐to‐performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans.     

Gains from quota trade: theoretical models and an application to the Danish fishery

We provide a framework for evaluating potential effects of introducingtradable quotas to a sector. The effects depend on the economiesof scale and scope of the production technology, and on firms'ability and willingness to learn best practice methods (catchingup) and to change their input and output composition (mix).To illustrate our approach, data from the Danish fishery areused to calculate the potential gains from introducing individuallytransferable fishing quotas. Data envelopment analysis is usedto model the production technology. We find that pure reallocationis as important as pure learning, i.e. quota reallocation withoutcatching-up is as valuable as learning best practice with fixedallocations.     

Rating mutual funds: Construction and information content of an investor-cost based rating of Danish mutual funds

We develop a new rating of mutual funds: the atpRating. The atpRating assigns crowns to each individual mutual fund based upon the costs an investor pays when investing in the fund in relation to what it would cost to invest in the fund's peers. Within each investment category, the rating assigns five crowns to funds with the lowest costs and one crown to funds with the highest costs.We investigate the ability of the atpRating to predict the future performance of a fund. We find that an investor who has invested in the funds with the lowest costs within an investment category would have obtained a risk-adjusted excess return that is approximately 3–4 percentage points higher per annum than if the funds with the highest costs had been invested in.We compare the atpRating with the Morningstar Rating. We show that one reason why the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating contain different information is that the returns Morningstar uses as inputs when rating funds are highly volatile whereas the costs the atpRating uses as inputs when rating funds are highly persistent. In other words, a fund that has low costs one year will most likely also have low costs the following year, whereas the return of a fund in a certain year generally contains only little information about the future return that the fund will generate.Finally, we have information on the investments in different mutual funds made by a small subgroup of investors known to have been exposed to both the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating. We find that investors have clear preferences for funds rated high by both the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating.