Measuring the Impact of Socio-Economic Factors on School Efficiency in Australia

This paper examines the productive efficiency of government schools in New South Wales (NSW) in Australia. The study uses a technical inefficiency effects model applied to a unique three-year panel dataset containing 1235 primary and 371 secondary schools in NSW. A stochastic frontier production function and an inefficiency effects function that control for school socioeconomic and environmental factors are estimated. The dataset contains information on various school inputs, school expenditures by major functional area, parental socioeconomic characteristics, student characteristics, and standardized test scores. We examine the degree to which school and non-school educational inputs influence student achievement scores and find that, overall, primary schools are 88.6% and secondary schools 96.4% efficient. The index describing community socio-educational advantage has the most significant influence on students’ achievement scores.     

Government Regulation,Corporate Board,and Firm Value: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of board composition and its consequences on firm value in China by focusing on the impact of ultimate owner type and financial needs under the institution environment with government intervention and weak investor protection. We find that State‐Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to choose politically connected directors without professional backgrounds, but non‐SOEs are more likely to have independent directors, or politically connected directors with professional business backgrounds. Appointment of independent directors has no effect on firm value. Due to weak legal investor protection in China, a dominant shareholder can easily remove independent directors, as there is no mature market for directors. Politically connected directors without professional business backgrounds are negatively associated with a firm's value. Although such directors can help a company establish relationships with the government, their firms may suffer due to inferior professionalism.     

Export survival and the dynamics of experience

This paper focuses on developing countries’ pioneer exports to the OECD and obtains several important results on export dynamics, linking export experience and export survival. Using product level data at the SITC 5-digit level for 114 developing countries over the 1962–2009 period, we show that prior export experience obtained in non-OECD markets significantly increases survival of pioneer exports toward the OECD. The experience does not need to last long, as gaining experience for more than two years does not confer any additional benefit. The effect of experience depreciates rapidly with time: a break in export experience prior to entering the OECD reduces the advantage on survival. Finally, the role of prior export experience is particularly relevant for survival in the first two years upon entry into the OECD. The geographic dynamic of export experience reveals that experience is acquired in neighboring, easy to access markets before reaching more distant, richer partners and ultimately serving the OECD with a higher probability of survival.     

Fighting Capital Flight in Africa: Evidence from Bundling and Unbundling Governance

This study investigates the effect of governance on capital flight by bundling and unbundling governance. The empirical evidence is based on 37 African countries for the period 1996–2010 and the Generalised Method of Moments. Governance is bundled by principal component analysis, namely: (i) political governance from political stability and ‘voice and accountability’; (ii) economic governance from government effectiveness and regulation quality and (iii) institutional governance from corruption-control and the rule of law. The following findings are established. (i) Political stability and ‘voice and accountability’ reduce capital flight while the collective effect of political governance is not significant. (ii) Economic governance increases capital flight whereas the individual effects of regulation quality and government effectiveness are not significant. (iii) Corruption-control and institutional governance negatively affect capital flight whereas the impact of the rule of law is not significant. (iv) Taken together, Corruption-control is the most effective governance weapon in the fight against capital flight. (v) Priority in the Washington Consensus is more effective at fighting capital flight compared to the Beijing Model. Policy implications are discussed.