Under What Conditions Is an Insurance Guaranty Fund Beneficial for Policyholders?

In this article, we derive conditions in an imperfect market setting, under which the introduction of a self‐supporting insurance guaranty fund improves the position of the policyholders. When a guaranty fund is advantageous given homogeneous firms in the market, all policyholders benefit from it to the same extent, if they have the same underlying risk preferences and are charged identical premiums. In a more realistic heterogeneous setting, the introduction of an insurance guaranty fund is in general no longer beneficial for all policyholders in the same manner. Hence, systematic wealth transfers take place between the policyholders of different insurance companies. As a possible solution, and in order to counteract this effect, we introduce a framework for utility‐based fund charges.     

Inefficient sales delays by a durable‐good monopoly facing a finite number of buyers

This article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow adoption of durable goods. We study a standard durable‐good monopoly model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the Pacman outcome—including the Coase conjecture. Of particular interest is a class of equilibria where the seller first charges a high price and only lowers that price once some—but not all—high‐valuation buyers purchase. This price structure creates a war of attrition between those buyers, which delays market clearing and rationalizes unscheduled purchase and price cut dates.     

The moderating effects of economic development on innovation and shadow entrepreneurship: grey or pink?

There is currently a renewed surge of interest in informal entrepreneurship around the world. One of the motives stems from how such entrepreneurship shapes and influences a substantial part of the global workforce. However, we may also verify how a major proportion of the research in this field focuses on developing economies and thus justifying the application of such analytical approaches to countries with different levels of economic development as is the case with Europe. Our research objectives, on the one hand, involve analysing the impact of R&D investment on informal entrepreneurship and, on the other hand, the moderating effect of the level of economic development on their innovative capacities and informal entrepreneurship results. To this end, and in accordance with Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, we divide the countries of Europe into two stages of development and may report that the higher the level of economic development, the greater the innovative capacity and, furthermore, the lower informal entrepreneurship becomes. The same holds for R&D investment with its increase being inversely proportionate to informal entrepreneurship. We, therefore, seek to contribute toward a better understanding of the problematic framework of informal entrepreneurship, in particular in the European context.     

The effect of prior outcomes on gender risk-taking differences

This study proposed that men are more likely to take greater risk after a win (‘house money’ effect), while women are more likely to take greater risk after a loss (‘escalation of commitment’ effect). These effects are, however, moderated by prior experiences in risk-taking and role characteristics. Three distinct groups of 30 subjects (total?=?90) each were solicited to play an experimental betting game. The subjects were categorized into risk providers (RP), risk customers (RC), and non-risk customers (NRC). RP are represented by casino executives, RC by leisure life-time casino gamblers, and NRC by non-casino gamblers. On average, RC group was found to take most betting risk. Male RCs were more likely to bet more after a win, while female RCs were more likely to bet more after a loss. NRCs, irrespective of gender, were more likely to bet more after a loss. There were no gender risk-taking differences in prior outcomes in the RP group.     

Market illiquidity and bounds on European option prices

The paper analyses the impact of illiquidity of a stock paying no dividends on the pricing of European options written on that stock. In particular, it is shown how illiquidity generates price bounds on an option on this stock, even in the absence of other imperfections, such as transaction costs and trading constraints, or the assumption of stochastic volatility. Moreover, price bounds are shown to be asymmetric with respect to the option price under perfect liquidity. This fact explains, under some conditions, the appearance of a smile effect when the implied volatility is estimated from the mid-quote.     

Liquidity risk and maturity management over the credit cycle

We show that firm demand-side factors are strong drivers of procyclical refinancing behavior over the credit cycle using novel data from the Shared National Credit program. Firms are more likely to refinance early when credit conditions are good to keep the effective maturity of their loans long and hedge against having to refinance in tight credit conditions. High credit quality firms are better able to hedge, making their refinancing propensity more sensitive to credit cycles than less creditworthy firms. There is a strong relationship between refinancing a loan, and subsequent growth in capital expenditure, especially when a loan is refinanced early.     

Valuation of forward start options under affine jump-diffusion models

Under the general affine jump-diffusion framework of Duffie et al. [Econometrica, 2000, 68, 1343–1376], this paper proposes an alternative pricing methodology for European-style forward start options that does not require any parallel optimization routine to ensure square integrability. Therefore, the proposed methodology is shown to possess a better accuracy–efficiency trade-off than the usual and more general approach initiated by Hong [Forward Smile and Derivative Pricing. Working paper, UBS, 2004] that is based on the knowledge of the forward characteristic function. Explicit pricing solutions are also offered under the nested jump-diffusion setting proposed by Bakshi et al. [J. Finance, 1997, 52, 2003–2049], which accommodates stochastic volatility and stochastic interest rates, and different integration schemes are numerically tested.     

American options and callable bonds under stochastic interest rates and endogenous bankruptcy

A new characterization of the American-style option is proposed under a very general multifactor Markovian and diffusion framework. The efficiency of the proposed pricing solutions is shown to depend only on the use of a viable valuation method for the corresponding European-style option and for the transition density of the model’s state variables. Under a Gauss-Markov stochastic interest rates setup, these new American option pricing solutions are shown to offer a much better accuracy-efficiency trade-off than the approximations already available in the literature. This result is also used to price callable corporate bonds under an endogenous bankruptcy structural approach, by decomposing the option to call or default into a European put on the firm value plus two early exercise premium components.     

Not Every Kind of Outward FDI Increases Parent Firm Performance: The Case of New EU Member States

Using a large firm-level dataset we investigate what kind of firms from new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) tend to invest abroad (testing of self-selection hypothesis), and what is the impact of outward FDI on their productivity (testing of learning-by-investing hypothesis). We find that the best firms tend to self-select into outward FDI. There is also a positive effect of outward FDI on productivity growth of investing firms from CEECs, the strongest being in the case of Estonia, Romania, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The positive impact of becoming a first-time foreign investor is relatively long lasting, but comes into effect only in investments in Western European or other CEECs and in the case of manufacturing subsidiaries.