DOES ORGANIZATION MATTER? A STUDY OF PHYSICIANS' IDEAL ORGANIZATION

It is a known phenomenon that it is difficult to make organizational changes within professional organizations. One recurring observation and experience from health care studies is that it is difficult to discuss the last organizational change with professionals because the most recent change is always perceived as the worst. In order to avoid this routine response, the authors of this article asked 56 senior physicians from the Swedish health care sector what their ideal organization looks like. The authors note that there is a strong institutionalized idea among the physicians of how health care should be organized. The image is not particularly complicated: the organization should be based on the meeting between doctor and patient. One conclusion in the article is that professionals dislike change, but nevertheless, they still want it. Actual change is not the problem – only changes that are not in compliance with the professionals' opinions of organization and management.     

Tolerance for uncertainty and the growth of informationally opaque industries

Hofstede's [Hofstede, Geert H. 1980. Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related values. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.] cross-country psychological survey of IBM employees finds that some countries (societies) are systematically less tolerant of uncertainty, while uncertainty-tolerance is shown by some theoretic models to be essential to the growth of emerging sectors about which less is known. This paper first uses Durnev, Morck, and Yeung's [Durnev, Art, Morck, Randall, and Yeung, Bernard. 2004. Value-enhancing capital budgeting and firm-specific stock return variation. The Journal of Finance. 59(1): 65–105.] methodology to identify these informationally opaque industries. The hypothesis is then made that countries characterized by high uncertainty aversion (measured by Hofstede's indicator, and two other alternative indicators) will grow disproportionately slower in industrial sectors where information is less available. Using the Rajan and Zingales [Rajan, Raghuram G. and Zingales, Luigi. 1998. Financial Dependence and Growth. American Economic Review. Vol. 88(3): 559–586.] “difference-in-differences” methodology, which is relatively free from the endogeneity problem, the study provides robust evidence of such an industrial growth pattern in 34 countries and 36 manufacturing industries. It also shows that national uncertainty aversion is not driven by underdevelopment of financial sector, inadaptability of civil law systems, lower level of economic or human capital development, labor market inflexibility, or any of many other institutional factors. The results remain robust when religious (Catholic vs. Protestant) composition is used as an instrumental variable for national uncertainty aversion. The international evidence presented helps explain why some countries are slower in embracing “new” (vs. traditional) industries.     

Endogenous Group Formation

While the rules governing the formation of groups engaging in collective action may have significant impact on group size and behavior of members, most experiments on public goods have been conducted with the subjects in exogenously fixed groups or of fixed sizes. We study endogenous formation of groups in a public‐goods provision game by allowing subjects to change groups under three sets of rules: free entry/exit, restricted entry with free exit, and free entry with restricted exit. We find that the rules governing entry and exit do have a significant impact on individual behavior and group‐level outcomes.     

Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.     

Extending working hours: why not work 42 h rather than 38?—a CGE analysis for Germany

Faced with a record level of unemployment, the present debate in Germany is to extend the weekly hours of work. In this paper the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly hours are quantified on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model for different specifications of the wage setting rule and the use of additional policy-induced public income. The simulation results back the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when the higher tax revenues from GDP growth are used to reduce social security contributions, then the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created can be supported.