Prognose des Abwicklungsergebnisses mittels Chain-Ladder-Verfahren für abhängige Run-Off-Portfolios

In the present paper we analyse how the estimators from Merz u. Wüthrich (2007) could be generalised to the case of N correlated run-off triangles. The simultaneous view on N correlated subportfolios is motivated by the fact, that in practice a run-off portfolio often has to be divided in subportfolios, so that the homogeneity assumption of the claims reserving method on each subportfolio is satisfied. We derive an explicit formula for the process-variance, the estimation-error and the prediction error made by the forecast for the claims development result with the Chain-Ladder method. We illustrate the results by an example.     

Auditor Reputation Under Different Negligence Regimes

Do auditor reputation effects evolve the same way under precise negligence as under vague negligence? Or are there differences? We assume that investors update their beliefs on unobservable auditor quality when an auditor discloses an inaccurate report. We call this a reputation effect. A necessary condition for reputation effects to occur is that, ex ante, investors expect ‘good’ auditors to take more care than ‘bad’ auditors such that ‘good’ auditors are less likely to issue an inaccurate report. Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume that wealthier (‘good’) auditors tend to take more care than less wealthy (‘bad’) auditors. We find that under vague negligence, reputation effects will occur, inducing both types of auditor to increase the level of care taken. A ‘good’ auditor is likely to exert excessive care. Then, even in the absence of auditor risk aversion, a (properly defined) liability cap is necessary to induce efficient incentives. A contractual liability cap is preferable to a legally fixed liability cap. Under precise negligence, a ‘good’ auditor will exert the standard of due care. However, a ‘bad’ auditor will also do so if sufficiently wealthy. Consequently, ex ante, investors do not expect different levels of care to be taken or reputation effects to occur. A liability cap is not desirable. This paper highlights the importance of non‐legal sanctions in auditor liability. Finally, it links the ‘reputation’ and ‘deep pocket’ hypotheses, both of which have attempted separately in the past to explain the positive correlation between auditor size and auditor quality.     

Staging of Venture Financing, Investor Opportunism and Patent Law

Abstract:  Stage financing provides a real option that is valuable when facing external uncertainty. However, it may also induce investor hold-up, if the property rights on an invention are not sufficiently protected. As a consequence, the entrepreneur may not work hard. Investor opportunism is less likely to occur, if investors' residual cash-flow-rights are contingent on verifiable 'milestones' in the previous stage. Equity-linked financing also provides high-powered incentives to the investor not to 'steal the idea' because his payoff becomes sensitive to the project value. The paper provides a new explanation for both types of contractual provisions.     

Are there free rides out of a recession? The case of Switzerland

During the 2008/2009 recession, most countries resorted to discretionary fiscal policy measures. In this paper, we run two simulations with the KOF Swiss Economic Institute’s macroeconomic model to assess how both the Swiss stimulus measures, and the measures taken by Switzerland’s major trading partners, have affected the Swiss economy. The KOF baseline estimate incorporates fiscal stimulus packages in Switzerland and abroad. We re-run the model, modifying the exogenous variables to represent situations in which no fiscal action was taken (a) in Switzerland and (b) elsewhere. We find that the spillover from the foreign efforts to curb the recession dwarfs the effect of the domestic stimulus packages. In addition to making its own (rather limited) efforts to fight the recession, Switzerland also took a long free-ride that far exceeded the short one it paid for.