Reinforcement versus balance response in sequential choice

Psychologists often explore the impact of one act on a subsequent related act. With an eye to the marketing literature, this paper explores two properties of sequential choices that involve the resolution of competing goals. Reinforcement occurs when the goals driving the first choice are made stronger by that choice and result in a congruent subsequent choice. Balance occurs when the first choice satisfies or extinguishes the goals that led to the original decision, producing an incongruent subsequent choice. This review examines a number of psychological frameworks that account for reinforcement or balance responses in sequential choice and identifies theoretically relevant moderating variables that lead to either response.     

Competitive Grants and the Funding of Agricultural Research in the United States

Efforts to improve public agricultural research efficiency include calls to increase use of competitive grants. This paper empirically assesses different instruments the USDA uses to fund state-level research. Compared with other instruments, competitive grants focus more on basic research and are concentrated among fewer states. Model results suggest that top-ranked biology and agricultural science programs were strong determinants of states' shares of competitive grants. Other significant factors were agricultural sector size and number of agricultural scientists. USDA-funded state-level research focus did not change significantly because competitive grants comprised only 15% of these funds and other instruments counteracted their influence.     

Managing service innovation: the need for selectivity rather than 'best practice'

In this paper we contrast the notions of best practice and configurations contingent on environmental conditions. The analysis draws upon our study of 38 UK and 70 US service firms. Four system configurations are identified, and the results provide an opportunity for updating the typologies of services, and suggest that practices and performance are multi-dimensional.     

The President Versus the Senate: Appointments in the American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve

For politicians, appointments are an instrument of policy influence.By installing their representatives in an institution, politicianscan count on policy influence for the duration of their appointees'terms. Given the stakes, the occasional controversy regardingnominees is understandable. On the whole, however, nominationsare not controversial; in fact, Senate confirmation votes areoften unanimous. Nevertheless, the Senate can have substantialinfluence in the appointment process. Using a formal model,this article examines how the president and Senate strategicallybargain with one another within the confines of the FederalReserve appointment process to influence monetary policy. Witha new way to estimate monetary policy preferences, this articleshows empirically that policy influence occurs via appointments.     

EVIDENCE ON ADJUSTMENTS IN MAJOR NATIONAL STOCK MARKET LINKAGES OVER THE 1980S

This paper measures the alterations that have occurred in equity market correlations for six major internationally active stock exchanges between 1980 and 1987. The markets are chosen so as to allow for geographical diversity while still accounting for almost ninety percent of total worldwide equity market capitalization. The VAR variance decomposition technique is used to measure intermarket linkage patterns. We find substantial alterations in intermarket linkage patterns occurring over the 1980s. While the US market (the New York Stock Exchange) is still the dominant financial force in world equities trading, other markets (particularly those in the Pacific Basin region) now account for an increasing impact on observed index correlations in the system. This paper suggests that world financial integration is, in part, responsible for the altered linkage patterns observed over the 1980s.