Are Investment Banks Special Too? Evidence on Relationship‐Specific Capital in Investment Bank Services

The question of whether optimal provision of these services comes mainly from established relationships between banks and client firms or can result from arms'‐length market transactions has been the topic of considerable recent debate. This discussion has paralleled the debate in the commercial banking literature on the “specialness” of banks and whether lending can and should be relational or purely transactional. Whether the provision of investment bank services is relationship‐based or transactional is especially relevant now thanks to recent trends that have blurred the distinction between commercial and investment banks, and changed the competitive landscape for investment bank services. In their study summarized in this article, the authors examine whether investment bank‐client relationships create valuable relationship‐specific capital using stock market evidence from the period surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Specifically, they studied the effect of the Lehman collapse on companies that used Lehman for (1) underwriting equity offerings, (2) underwriting debt offerings, (3) advice on mergers and acquisitions, (4) analyst research services, and (5) market‐making services. The study addressed two specific questions. First, which investment bank services, if any, are associated with the creation of relationship‐specific capital; and second, what are the value drivers of this relationship capital? The authors report finding that companies that used Lehman as lead underwriter for public equity offerings experienced significantly negative abnormal stock returns in the days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy announcement. By contrast, they find no significant reaction to the announcement for Lehman's debt underwriting clients or any of the other client categories they examine. While most of these investment bank services have at least the potential to create relationship‐specific capital, the authors' findings suggest that except for equity underwriting, all the other investment bank services appear to be transactional rather than relationship‐based, at least in the average case. Moreover, the authors report significant differences even among different groups of Lehman's equity underwriting clients. An equity underwriting relationship with Lehman appears to have been especially valuable for smaller, younger, and more financially constrained firms—those firms which presumably had a high degree of dependence on Lehman to access the capital market.     

Marketing Period Risk in a Portfolio Context: Comment and Extension

This paper re-examines and extends the findings of Bond et al., Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 34, 447–461, (2007) who consider the theoretical model of Lin and Vandell, Real Estate Economics, 35, 291–330, (2007) to determine the extent to which individual real estate asset return characteristics caused by marketing period risk disappear in a large, diversified real estate portfolio. The effects of marketing period risk are found to disappear in the limit with growth in the size of the portfolio, with ex ante variance approaching ex post variance, but only if the portfolio consists of nonsystematic risk alone, in which case both approach zero. The marketing period risk factor (MPRF), representing the ratio of ex ante to ex post variance, however, does not in general approach zero in the limit, in fact could increase or decrease depending upon the illiquidity characteristics of the individual assets and the magnitude and degree of correlation among individual property returns and marketing periods. The results suggest that even large institutional real estate portfolio managers must consider the illiquidity present in their portfolios and cannot assume that its effect will be diversified away.

Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.     

Policy implications of research on non-GAAP reporting

Over the past two decades, the regulatory landscape for non-GAAP reporting has evolved significantly. Despite a temporary decline in the frequency of non-GAAP reporting following Regulation G, the incidence of non-GAAP disclosure has continued to increase steadily, leading to a current all-time high in reporting activity. This proliferation of non-GAAP disclosure has captured the attention of standard setters and regulators in recent years. This paper provides an academic perspective on policy implications for both regulation and standard setting. We contend that current Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs) of the SEC staff may perhaps have gone too far in restricting certain types of non-GAAP disclosures. As a result, we advocate a slight relaxation of the current enforcement of Regulation G. We agree with FASB proposals for greater disaggregation in the income statement to allow for more transparency in non-GAAP reporting. Finally, we believe the PCAOB should consider requiring auditors to take a more direct role with respect to non-GAAP disclosures.     

Do specialized board committees impact the transparency of corporate political disclosure? Evidence from S&P 500 companies

This study examines how the specific attributes of one type of voluntary corporate governance mechanism, a specialized political contribution committee, improves the transparency of corporate political disclosure (CPD). The results demonstrate that the existence of a committee that establishes and reviews key political activities and disclosure policies, particularly one composed entirely of outside directors, significantly enhances the transparency of corporate political disclosure, and reveal that an under-studied board committee, the political contribution committee, effectively improves CPD transparency. The results are consistent with agency theory and further support the more generalizable idea that specialized governance mechanisms (e.g., a political contribution committee) and fully independent committees lead to more transparent disclosure. Finally, the results suggest that the existence of a political contribution committee and committee independence are channels to improve CPD transparency. Public-policy makers and regulators seeking to enhance CPD transparency might consider implementing regulations that mandate or recommend these governance mechanisms as best practice.     

Behavioral portfolio selection and optimization: an application to international stocks

The behavioral approach of decision making has emerged as a diversified solution in the presence of risk and uncertainty. Using the popular cumulative prospect theory as an objective function for portfolio selection, this study implements the classical mean–variance model to compare the portfolio performance of high behavioral stocks with that of stocks with lower behavioral values. Based on a sample of 37 international stocks over the period from October 1998 to November 2017, empirical results from D-vine pair copula GARCH-GEV indicate that the portfolio of high behavioral prospect stocks outperforms the portfolio of stocks with low behavioral scores. This finding may suggest that portfolios with high behavioral values coincide with rational efficiency sets.     

Risk-based forecasting and planning and management earnings forecasts

This study examines the association between a firm’s internal information environment and the accuracy of its externally disclosed management earnings forecasts. Internally, firms use forecasts to plan for uncertain futures. The risk management literature argues that integrating risk-related information into forecasts and plans can improve a firm’s ability to forecast financial outcomes. We investigate whether this internal information manifests itself in the accuracy of external earnings guidance. Using detailed survey data and publicly disclosed management earnings forecasts from a sample of publicly traded U.S. companies, we find that more sophisticated risk-based forecasting and planning processes are associated with smaller earnings forecast errors and narrower forecast widths. These associations hold across a variety of different planning horizons (ranging from annual budgeting to long-term strategic planning), providing empirical support for the theoretical link between internal information quality and the quality of external disclosures.     

Private equity leveraged buyouts in European telecoms: The case of Eircom

Highly leveraged buyouts (LBOs) of former state owned telecoms operators by private equity groups have occurred in a number of countries in recent years. This paper examines the case of Eircom in Ireland which has experienced five changes in ownership since full privatisation in 1999, two of which were LBOs. Enormous increases in Eircom’s debt levels as a result of the LBOs resulted in the company’s bankruptcy in 2012. This paper argues that this outcome was largely attributable to the short-termist strategies adopted by the private equity groups that assumed ownership of the enterprise. These strategies included high leverage, cash extraction and underinvestment in the fixed-line network which contributed to the demise of the enterprise and had wider economic and social effects. The Eircom case demonstrates the risks attendant to ownership of important network infrastructure by private equity groups and the need for regulatory safeguards to protect the public interest.     

Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early‐stage CEO evaluation

This study develops and tests predictions regarding factors that influence early‐stage CEO evaluation. We suggest that contextual elements of the CEO succession process will influence the heuristics that directors employ to aid in their early evaluation of a CEO because traditional performance metrics, such as firm performance, are less diagnostic of CEO quality in the first years of their tenure. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.