Land rents,optimal taxation and local fiscal independence in an economy with local public goods

A general equilibrium model of an economy with cities, farms and free migration of population is constructed. The cities produce internationally traded goods via production functions subject to economies of scale. They also produce housing and a local public good. Two areas are defined to be disjoint if households performing an economic activity in one area are not operating in the other. An area is exclusive if it is disjoint to its complement. The economic surplus of an area is then defined to be the value of the area's net export of goods and resources. Local efficiency of an area is defined to be a state in which its economic surplus attains its maximum value. This state is proved to be a necessary condition for Pareto optimality of the economy. It is then proved that beside Piguvian corrective taxes the only taxes necessary and sufficient to finance local government activities efficiently, are taxes on land rents. Furthermore, if jurisdiction of a local government is over an exclusive area no intervention of central government is necessary, and local authorities can be fully autonomous. If the economy can be divided into pairwise disjointed exclusive areas, those areas are optimal jurisdictions in the sense that efficiency in the economy can be achieved with local authorities only.     

ASYMPTOTIC NORMALITY OF A NONPARAMETRIC INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATOR*

This article gives conditions under which the nonparametric instrumental variables estimator of Hall and Horowitz (Annals of Statistics 33 (December 2005), 2904–2929) is asymptotically normally distributed. With sufficiently large samples, the asymptotic normality result can be used to form confidence intervals for the unknown function that is estimated by the Hall–Horowitz procedure. The article reports the results of a Monte Carlo investigation of the finite‐sample coverage probabilities of the confidence intervals.     

Competitive price-cutting momentum and pricing reactions

In light of the increasing interest in understanding the behavioral side of competitive decision making, this paper examines how the price-cutting momentum (PCM) created by other competiors' reactions to an initiator's price cut influences pricing decisions. We explore the PCM construct and present the results of a study examining the effect of PCM on the price recommendations of retail grocery pricing executives. We find that PCM influences pricing reactions inboth low-search and high-search markets. Competing explanations of the results are considered.The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Department of Sponsored Programs and Research at the University of South Carolina and the Crane Professorship at the Ohio State University.     

PRICE,PRODUCT QUALITY,AND EXPORTER DYNAMICS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This article develops a model of heterogeneous firms that endogenously choose prices and product quality to build demand in export markets. New exporters optimally charge relatively low prices and produce low‐quality goods upon entry. Product quality, prices, and sales increase as demand grows. We structurally estimate model parameters using Chinese customs data. The estimated incentive to build future demand reduces average export prices by 0.7% and increases export sales by 4% upon entry. Endogenous demand accumulation causes estimated export prices, product quality, and sales to grow by 2.2%, 12%, and 79%, respectively, over the following five years.     

ReGale: Some memorable results

This article reviews, with admiration and awe, the scientific contributions of David Gale.     

Dynamics of dyadic competitive interaction

In this study of firms’ entries into and exits from each other’s markets, we link research on multipoint competition to the emerging action‐oriented, dyadic approach to interfirm rivalry by specifying market interdependencies between pairs of firms that condition their potential for rivalry over time. Our dynamic analysis of competitive interactions between pairs of commuter airlines in California reveals the idiosyncratic and asymmetric market microstructures that characterize dyadic competitive relationships and helps explain why firms grapple vigorously with some of their competitors while being passive toward others. We show that there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between firms’ rates of entry into and exit from each other’s markets and the level of multimarket contact in competitor dyads. We also show how this basic curvilinear effect varies from dyad to dyad as a function of relative levels of multimarket contact with competitors in other dyads and the relative sizes of competitors in a focal dyad. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.