EVOLUTION OR EXTINCTION: WHERE ARE BANKS HEADED?

The banking industry represents an interesting and important case study of how changes in technology and regulation influence business strategy and organizational design. A narrow focus on traditional bank products and performance measures would lead one to conclude that banking is a declining industry. Such a focus, however, would miss most of the innovations in banking–most notably, the move to “off-balance-sheet” activities–that have been taking place in recent years. A broader perspective shows banks evolving in ways that are enabling them to provide the same basic functions as before, but in new, more efficient ways. In the past, most banks thought of themselves as delivering a set of specific, largely unrelated products to different sets of customers. Today many banks are pursuing strategies that aim to strengthen their ability to perform various functions–for example, financial planning for retail clients, or raising capital for middle market companies–that tend to cut across the old product boundaries. As a result, and in contrast to most industrial firms, many banks are offering a more diversified range of products and services than ever before with the aim of exploiting potential synergies among those products. Such major changes in banks' strategies are in turn leading to fundamental changes in their “organizational architecture.” Some banking activities that were once controlled by a rigid management hierarchy are now being decentralized, whereas other functions that were largely decentralized are being subjected to more central coordination to help realize potential economies of scale and scope. Along with these changes in decision-making authority, banks are also being forced to rethink their internal performance evaluation and incentive compensation systems. As an ever larger portion of their activities continues to move off balance sheet, more and more banks are deciding that conventional accounting measures of bank operating performance such as ROA and ROE are inadequate, and that economic measures of performance like RAROC and EVA are needed to reflect the new reality of where banks are putting their capital at risk, and whether the rates of return they are earning on their different activities are high enough to reward their shareholders.     

Privatization: Choosing the Optimal Time Path

We consider a government that wishes to choose the optimal time path of privatization. The government is concerned with maximizing output over some specified period while taking into account (1) the level of unemployment that will be attained as the end of that period, (2) the improvement in labor productivity of workers in the nationalized enterprises as a consequence of growing competition from privatized firms, and (3) the reemployment rate of the redundant workers displaced as their firms become privatized. We present a model exhibiting these features and derive the optimal policy that characterizes the rate of privatization within the period. When all of the elements noted above are present, we show it is never optimal to privatize instantaneously. We also show the relationship of the optimal rate of transition to the underlying objectives of the government. J. Comp. Econom., December 1993, 17(4), pp. 715-736. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York 10012.     

Effective advertising in industrial supplier directories

This article discusses the relative effectiveness of various advertisement characteristics in industrial supplier directories. Correlations and regressions on ad characteristics and response data indicate that ad space (size and/or number) and logos have a positive impact while the impact of pictures can be negative.     

Breeding and raiding: A theory of strategic production of skills

Some of the skills that firms require are obtained only through on-the-job-training. This paper concentrates on the strategic production of skills within the firm. Firms obtain high-quality workers either by training their own (breeding) or by using the open market to bid away workers trained by other firms (raiding). Even when all firms have access to the same technology of production, training, and breeding, it will typically be the case that both breeding and raiding will be pursued, with equal profitability, in equilibrium. Thus, we explain raiding behavior as part of an equilibrium theory. This paper also studies the effect of the decision to train workers on the optimal firm size and the distribution of income.     

Wealth, Information Acquisition, and Portfolio Choice

I solve (with an approximation) a Grossman-Stiglitz economyunder general preferences, thus allowing for wealth effects.Because information generates increasing returns, decreasingabsolute risk aversion, in conjunction with the availabilityof costly information, is sufficient to explain why wealthierhouseholds invest a larger fraction of their wealth in riskyassets. One no longer needs to resort to decreasing relativerisk aversion, an empirically questionable assumption. Furthermore,I show how to distinguish empirically between these two explanations.Finally, I find that the availability of costly informationexacerbates wealth inequalities.     

Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity Cost When They See One? A Dismal Performance or an Arbitrary Concept?

2005 asked 199 professional economists a multiple‐choice question about opportunity cost. Given that only 21.6% answered “correctly,” they conclude that professional understanding of the concept is “dismal.” We challenge this critique of the profession. Specifically, we allow for alternative opportunity cost accounting methodologies—one of which is derived from the term's definition as found in Ferraro and Taylor— and rely on the conventional relationship between willingness to pay and substitute goods to demonstrate that every answer to the multiple‐choice question is defensible. The Ferraro and Taylor survey question suggests difficulties in framing an opportunity cost accounting question, as well as a lack of coordination in opportunity cost accounting methodology. In scope and logic, we conclude that the survey question does not, however, succeed in measuring professional understanding of opportunity cost. A discussion follows as to the concept's appropriate role in the classroom.     

Movie piracy and sales displacement in two samples of Chinese consumers

Intellectual property piracy is widely believed, by authorities in both US industry and government, to be rampant in China. Because we lack evidence on the rate at which unpaid consumption displaces paid consumption, we know little about the size of the effect of pirate consumption on the volume of paid consumption. We provide direct evidence on both the volume of unpaid consumption and the rate of sales displacement for movies in China using two surveys administered in late 2008 and mid-2009. First, using a survey of Chinese college students’ movie consumption and an empirical approach parallel to a similar recent study of US college students, we find that three quarters of movie consumption is unpaid and that each instance of unpaid consumption displaces 0.14 paid consumption instances. Second, a survey of online Chinese consumers reveals similar patterns of paid and unpaid movie consumption but a displacement rate of roughly zero. We speculate on the small displacement rate finding relative to most of the piracy literature.