Social Status,Entry and Predation: The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929

The authors incorporate social status and regional affiliation—two variables of central sociological interest—into an economic analysis of entry and predation. They build on Scott Morton’s [1997] examination of entry and predation in the merchant shipping industry and examine whether the social status of an entrant owner impacts on the predation behavior of the incumbent cartels. They find that high social status entrants are significantly less likely (40%) to be preyed upon than the low social status entrants. They discuss several interpretations of this result. Subsequent analysis supports the hypothesis that cartel members use social status as an indicator of an entrant’s propensity to be a cooperative cartel participant.     

Bootstrapping the Box–Pierce Q test: A robust test of uncorrelatedness

This paper describes a test of the null hypothesis that the first K autocorrelations of a covariance stationary time series are zero in the presence of statistical dependence. The test is based on the Box–Pierce Q statistic with bootstrap-based P-values. The bootstrap is implemented using a double blocks-of-blocks procedure with prewhitening. The finite sample performance of the bootstrap Q   test is investigated by simulation. In our experiments, the performance is satisfactory for samples of n=500$n=500$. At this sample size, the differences between the empirical and nominal rejection probabilities are essentially eliminated.     

Trade negotiations, domestic policies, and the Most Favored Nation clause

Abstract.  This paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non-discrimination links trade agreements to non-trade agreements and, under certain conditions, helps governments further lower tariffs and/or domestic standards (policies). These conditions are: (i) governments' objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards (policies); (ii) domestic standards are sufficiently valued; and (iii) policies are strategic complements. These can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non-discrimination.     

Transaction utility effects when quality is uncertain

The existing literature finds that price discrepancy, which represents the difference between expected and observed price, helps explain brand choice and purchase intention. This effect is often attributed to transaction utility, that is, the incremental utility associated with the surprise of observing a price lower or higher than expected. This research considers the possibility, however, that transaction utility is a less important determinant of choice when quality is uncertain. We propose and find that acquisition utility (perceived value for the money) tends to dominate the explanation of purchase intention, but transaction utility is significant only when consumers are more certain about quality. Our discussion considers the relative role of transaction utility in explaining consumer decision making and how the informative and allocative roles of price might be distinguished. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from Ohio State University and his B.S. from Ohio State University. His research interests include information economics and pricing. Previously, he taught at the University of South Carolina. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, andJournal of Retailing, among others. He received his Ph.D. at the University of South Carolina, his M.B.A. from the University of Georgia, and a B.S. degree from Clemson University. Previously, he taught at the University of Alabama. His research interests include consumer perceptions of value and interpersonal influences. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research and theJournal of Marketing Research, among others. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from the University of South Carolina and has a Bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Delhi. His research interests include price bundling, price effects on perceived quality perceptions, and segmentation of business-to-business markets. He has published in theJournal of Business Research and theAdvances in Consumer Research series, published by the Association of Consumer Research. He previously taught on the faculty of Valdosta State University. She received a B.S. in statistics, a Ph.D. in marketing from the University of South Carolina, and a M.S. in statistics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. She previously taught at Lehigh University. Her research interests include market segmentation, discrete data analysis, and pricing. She has published in theJournal of Marketing Research, as well as in theProceedings of the American Marketing Association and theAssociation for Consumer Research.     

Do Taxes Matter for Foreign Direct Investment?

The tax sensitivity of foreign direct investment (FDI) has importantpolicy implications. If FDI is not responsive to taxation, thenit may be an appropriate target for taxation by the host country.This question is examined for Mexico by estimating the responseof FDI from retained earnings and transfers from abroad to thetax regimes in Mexico and the home country, the credit statusof multinationals, country risk factors, and regulatory andtrade regimes in Mexico. FDI in Mexico is found to be sensitiveto the tax regimes in Mexico and the United States, the creditstatus of multinationals, country credit ratings, and the regulatoryenvironment. Thus Mexico's current policies to dismantle regulationsand employ a tax system competitive with the United States areexpected to have salutory effects on FDI in Mexico.     

Disequilibrium theory,waiting costs,and saving behavior in centrally planned economies: A queueing-theoretic approach

An expected-utility maximizer, obliged to make a single purchase from two alternatives, finds that a queue forms for the good that would have been selected had both goods been available. An M/M/1 queue is posited and for each period of delay the maximum additional payment $\text{b}{}^1$ that the consumer would incur to join the queue is determined. This has implications for saving. Not only the availability of the good, but also the delay in obtaining it, the alteration in its arrival rate, and the “stampede effect” determine saving behavior.