Perverse Audit Culture and Accountability of the Modern Public University

The audit culture which has developed in public universities has led to counter‐productive outcomes. Managerial oversight of academic work has reached a critical tipping point. Extensive auditing of research output by means of performance management assessment regimes motivated by a New Public Management mentality has damaged individual scholarship and threatened academic freedom. Such assessment regimes are perverse and conducive to the development of psychotic tendencies by universities. It is important to understand the effects of a perverse audit culture when re‐thinking and reforming approaches to university performance management. We suggest ways for public universities to acknowledge the need for accountability while remaining true to core academic purposes.     

Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

A setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered. With correlated productivities, each agent's private information also provides a signal about the other agent's productivity. In contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent, it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents. It is only if the agents are risk-averse that their private information may allow them to command rents. Moreover, when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a Nash equilibrium, the Pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth-telling. This leads to the consideration of truth-telling equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents. Among all such equilibria, the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a Nash response to truth.     

Disequilibrium theory,waiting costs,and saving behavior in centrally planned economies: A queueing-theoretic approach

An expected-utility maximizer, obliged to make a single purchase from two alternatives, finds that a queue forms for the good that would have been selected had both goods been available. An M/M/1 queue is posited and for each period of delay the maximum additional payment $\text{b}{}^1$ that the consumer would incur to join the queue is determined. This has implications for saving. Not only the availability of the good, but also the delay in obtaining it, the alteration in its arrival rate, and the “stampede effect” determine saving behavior.     

Estimating compensating and equivalent income variations from hedonic price models

Estimates of welfare changes obtained from hedonic price models usually consist of changes in Marshallian consumer's surplus. This note shows how compensating and equivalent income variations can be computed from the information available in hedonicprice models.     

Concepts of extended preference

This paper remedies ambiguity in the discussion of interdependent preferences by developing a consistent set of distinctions, which span the full range of sympathetic and antipathetic interaction, for the two-person case without reactive behavior. It defines concepts such as benevolence, generosity, altruism, destructiveness, and willingness to begrrudge transfers to others and indicates how their use can clarify the discussion of economic behavior. The definitions take account of preferences (indicated by rates of substitution) and prices (indicated by rates of exchange) at critical income allocations.     

TWO READINGS AND AN EPILOGUE: A COMMENTARY ON THE VOICE OF SEDUCTION IN MYNATTET AL.

Two readings are made of Mynatt, Omundson, Schroeder and Stevens (pp. 657–683). The first reading views the paper through a largely “conventional” social science lens, while the second adopts a more critical perspective which raises three issues: abstraction in research; gender and ethnicity; and the rhetoric of research.     

The Revenue Consequences of Using Formula Apportionment to Calculate U.S. and Foreign-Source Income: A Firm-Level Analysis

This paper examines the 1989–1993 publicly available financial reports of 46 U.S.-based multinationals to estimate the revenue implications of implementing a U.S. federal formula apportionment system. Ignoring behavioral responses, we estimate shifting to an equal-weighted, three-factor formula would have increased their U.S. tax liabilities by 38 percent, with an 81 percent increase for oil and gas firms. We find the firms report a lower percentage of their worldwide profits as American profits than their American share of assets, sales, or payroll. The results may be attributed to more profitable foreign operations, tax-motivated income shifting, or measurement error.     

Options Trading and the CAPM

This article studies equilibrium asset pricing when agents facenonnegative wealth constraints. In the presence of these constraintsit is shown that options on the market portfolio are nonredundantsecurities and the economy's pricing kernel is a function ofboth the market portfolio and the nonredundant options. Thisimplies that the options should be useful for explaining riskyasset returns. To test the theory, a model is derived in whichthe expected excess return on any risky asset is linearly related(via a collection of betas) to the expected excess return onthe market portfolio and to the expected excess returns on thenonredundant options. The empirical results indicate that thereturns on traded index options are relevant for explainingthe returns on risky asset portfolios.     

Social networks in the global banking sector

We show that banks with shared social connections partner more often in the global syndicated loan market and that central banks in the network play dominant roles in various interbank transactions, indicating that social connections facilitate business connections. However, more centralized banks in the network also contribute significantly to the global systemic risk. Moreover, we find the soft information generated by social networks is particularly valuable when potential partners operate under different accounting and regulatory standards. Finally, we show that the recent banking crisis significantly limited the positive soft information effects of social networks in the global banking system.