Have R&D Spillovers Declined in the 21st Century?

Slow growth over the last decade has prompted policy attention towards increasing R&D spending, often via the tax system. We examine the impact of R&D on firm performance, both by the firm's own investments and through positive (and negative) spillovers from other firms. We analyse panel data on US firms over the last three decades, and allow for time‐varying spillovers in both technology space (knowledge spillover) and product market space (product market rivalry). We show that the magnitude of R&D spillovers remains as large in the second decade of the 21^st century as it was in the mid 1980s. Since the ratio of the social return to the private return to R&D is about four to one, this implies that there remains a strong case for public support of R&D. Positive spillovers appeared to temporarily increase in the 1995–2004 digital technology boom. We also show how these micro estimates relate to estimates from the endogenous growth literature and give some suggestions for future work.     

If You Can Measure It,You Can Manage It: A Case of Intellectual Capital

Despite the great importance attributed to intellectual capital (IC) in the past two decades or so, its measurement and management have remained elusive, mainly because of inappropriate prior models of IC measurement. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to make adjustments to an existing model, the Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC), and to present an adjusted‐VAIC model to measure IC. We tested our new model on data from 10 emerging and developed world markets and obtained more consistent results than prior studies. Our results indicate a significant positive relationship between IC and its components (human, innovation and physical capitals) and firm performance. Therefore, the adjusted‐VAIC model can be used with confidence to measure IC. Our study has important implications for both academia and industry concerning the measurement of IC.     

The US financial crisis and corporate dividend reactions: for better or for worse?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine how changes in dividend policy in 2008 as the financial crisis was unfolding influenced firm risk-adjusted returns in the following years....     

Who benefits in a crisis? Evidence from hedge fund stock and option holdings

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.     

The effect of general counsel prominence on the pricing of audit services

We investigate the effect of corporate general counsel (GC) ascension to the senior management team on the pricing of audit services. Prior research suggests that the GC position may have a significant influence in setting the tone at the top by promoting corporate integrity, ethics, and serving as a governance and monitoring mechanism, but also recognizes that prominent GCs may face ethical dilemmas, causing them to disregard professional responsibilities to curry the favor of the CEO and other executives. Using audit fees to proxy for audit engagement risk, we find a negative association between GC ascension to top management and audit fees. We investigate the mechanisms behind this relation and find GC ascension is associated with a reduction in both default risk and financial misstatement risk, which supports auditors’ perceived reduction in client business risk and audit risk, respectively.     

CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.     

Why do auditors fail? What might work? What won’t?†

Auditing failures and scandals have become commonplace. In response, reformers (including the Kingman Review in the U.K. and a recent report of the U.K.’s Competition and Market Authority) have proposed a variety of remedies, including prophylactic bans on auditors providing consulting services to their clients in the belief that this will minimize the conflicts of interest that produce auditing failures. Although useful, such reforms are already in place to a considerable degree and may have reached the point of diminishing returns. Moreover, this strategy does not address the deeper problem that clients (or their managements) may not want aggressive auditing, but rather prefer a deferential and perfunctory audit. If so, auditors will realize that they are marketing a ‘commodity’ service and cannot successfully compete based on their quality of services. Rationally, they would respond to such a market by seeking to adopt a cost-minimization strategy, competing by reducing the cost of their services and not investing in new technology or higher-priced personnel.

What could change this pattern? Gatekeepers, including auditors, serve investors, but are hired by corporate management. To induce gatekeepers to better serve investors, one needs to reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding this relationship by making gatekeepers more accountable to investors. This might be accomplished through litigation (as happens to some degree in the U.S.), but the U.K. and Europe have rules that discourage collective litigation. Thus, a more feasible approach would be to give investors greater ability to select and remove the auditor. This paper proposes a two part strategy to this end: (1) public ‘grading’ of the auditor by the audit regulator in an easily comparable fashion (and with a mandatory grading curve), and (2) enabling a minority of the shareholders (hypothetically, 10%) to propose a replacement auditor for a shareholder vote. It further argues that both activist shareholders and diversified shareholders might support such a strategy and undertake it under different circumstances. Absent such a focus on agency costs, however, reformers are likely only re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.     

The relative influence of price and non-price factors on short-term retail deposit quantities?

This study explores how price and non-price factors influence change in the quantity of short-term retail deposits held by depository institutions. The analysis is undertaken for a sample of UK building societies over 23 years using a disaggregated data set with a two-stage econometric procedure involving system estimators in a panel framework using seemingly unrelated regression, generalised method of moments and an ordinary least-squares fixed effects estimators to control for contemporaneous correlation and endogeneity concerns. Price factors examined include the policy or base rate and retail deposit interest rates set by individual building societies and non-price factors including the branch network and the number of deposit accounts offered by individual building societies. The cost of funds, one non-price factor and occurrence of mergers are consistently significant influences of retail deposit quantities. We conclude risk assessment of retail deposit quantity and monetary policy transmission would benefit from considering both price and non-price factors, rather than only price factors.     

Implications of biased reporting: conservative and liberal accounting policies in oligopolies

We examine the effects of biased (conservative or liberal) reporting on product market competition. Cournot duopolists observe either firm-specific or industry-wide shocks and provide noisy reports subject to an exogenous mandated bias attributed to public policy. Given neutral prior beliefs, either a conservative bias or a liberal bias enhances overall reporting-system informativeness as measured by the reduction of uncertainty. Consistent with previously established effects in the information sharing literature regarding increases in informativeness, we show that expected industry profits and expected consumer surplus may gain or lose from bias, depending on whether the shocks are firm-specific or industry-wide and the degree of product competition. Expected social welfare, however, always increases in bias, irrespective of the source of uncertainty and product substitutability or complementarity. We next consider a setting where firms self-select whether to bias reports and characterize regions of potential conflict with a public policy that maximizes expected social welfare. Further results on the differential effects of conservative or liberal bias follow from relaxing the assumption of neutral prior beliefs.     

Errors and questionable judgments in analysts’ DCF models

We investigate the number of and reasons for errors and questionable judgments that sell-side equity analysts make in constructing and executing discounted cash flow (DCF) equity valuation models. For a sample of 120 DCF models detailed in reports issued by U.S. brokers in 2012 and 2013, we estimate that analysts make a median of three theory-related and/or execution errors and four questionable economic judgments per DCF. Recalculating analysts’ DCFs after correcting for major errors changes analysts’ mean valuations and target prices by between ?2 and 14 % per error. Based on face-to-face interviews with analysts and those who oversee them, we conclude that analysts’ DCF modeling behavior is semi-sophisticated in the sense that analysts genuinely make mistakes regarding certain aspects of correctly valuing equity but also respond rationally to the incentives they face, particularly the reality that they are not directly compensated for being textbook DCF correct.