How Naïve Is the Market’s Use of Firm‐Specific Earnings Information?

Recent studies suggest the apparent delay in the stock-price response to earnings announcements (i.e., post-earnings announcement drift) is caused by investors who underestimate the autocorrelation of seasonally-differenced earnings (persistence). I present results that suggest: (1) a firm's future persistence is predictable on the basis of its past persistence; (2) the immediate stock-price response to earnings is positively related to historical persistence; (3) post-earnings-announcement drift is independent of historical persistence; and (4) consistent with (2) and (3), the difference between a firm's current observed persistence and that implied in stock prices is independent of its historical persistence. These results extend prior research by demonstrating that investors are aware not only that seasonally-differenced earnings are autocorrelated, but that investors recognize firm-specific differences in the magnitude of the autocorrelation.     

External Sources of Innovative Capabilities: The Preferences for Strategic Alliances or Mergers and Acquisitions

This paper explores the preferences that companies have as they use alternative (quasi) external sources of innovative competencies such as strategic technology alliances, mergers and acquisitions, or a mix of these. These alternatives are studied in the context of distinct industrial, technological and international settings during the first half of the 1990s. Different strategies followed by companies and the role played by routinized sets of preferences are also taken into consideration. The analysis demonstrates that these options are influenced by both different environmental conditions and firm specific circumstances, such as those related to protecting core businesses.     

Regulatory Control of the Track Access Charges of Railtrack plc

Railtrack plc, floated in 1996, was the private sector owner of Britain's railway track, signals and stations. Its major source of revenue came from track access charges, which individual train operating companies (TOCs) paid for use of the infrastructure. Since many of these TOCs received substantial subsidies to assist in paying their track access charges, Railtrack was in effect being heavily subsidised. In October 2001, the Government decided that these arrangements were no longer viable and placed Railtrack into administration. This article explains how the level of indirect subsidies to Railtrack had become excessive, and raises crucial questions that need to be addressed in settling the future shape of the railway industry.     

The political economy of quality measurement: a case study of the USA slaughter cattle market

As agricultural products move from being economic commodities to quality–differentiated goods, price dispersion within specific markets increases and implicit subsidies from high quality producers to low quality producers are removed. The present paper examines how these distributional effects can influence patterns of support and opposition to changes in marketing arrangements. The simple model developed is calibrated using data from the USA slaughter cattle market. Estimates of the impact on prices of measuring quality more accurately are found to be similar in size to previous estimates of market power price suppression in the market.     

Some 'real' problems of 'virtual' organisation

This paper presents an ethnographic study of organisational change in a retail bank considering issues surrounding the supposed emergence of the 'virtual organisation'. It outlines emerging problems in organisational work as a consequence of the shift toward 'virtuality' and questions the explanatory value of such theoretical stances.     

PROCYCLICAL RETAIL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY*

The influence of lagged adjustment and consumer spending on retail labour productivity is investigated. Both influences result in a procyclical productivity pattern.     

Varietal Licensing Standards and Canadian Wheat Exports

Canada's wheat grading system is largely based on visual criteria and it is based on relatively high quality standards. A strict varieties licensing system exists to maintain the integrity of the grade standards. One of the consequences of the licensing system is that higher yielding, lower or different quality wheats have not been grown in Canada until recently. The basic objective of this paper is to examine some of the consequences of the regulatory strategy of limiting wheat production to the traditional high quality wheats. This question is analyzed in the context of important changes in the international grain markets. Using a partial equilibrium trade model this paper estimates that if higher yielding wheats were permitted to be grown, annual producer gains would be 5 to 17 percent of current net farm income.
Le classement des blés au Canada est basé sur des critères visuels qui sont de hautes qualités. Le système actuel d'homologation des variétés est tel que l'intégrité de ce système est maintenue. En conséquent, ce système n'a pas encouragé la cultivation des blés de hauts rendements ou des varietés différentes que tout récemment. L'objectif principal de cette étude est d'examiner quelques unes des conséquences de la stratégic de la réglementation visant à limiter la production du blé aux variétés de hautes qualités. Cette question est adressée dans le contexte des changements importants qui ont eu lieu dans le marché international des grains. A l'aide d'un modèle d'équilibre partiel des échanges, la présente étude démontre gu'en permettant la production des blés de hauts rendements, le gain annuel aux producteurs serait de 5 à 17 pourcent du revenue agricole net.     

Contract compliance and equal opportunities

In 1983, the Greater London Council adopted a policy of 'Contract Compliance' designed to ensure that firms selling goods and services to the Council complied with its equal opportunity requirements. The initiative aroused wide interest and many other local authorities - 40 are known of to date - have been considering introducing such a policy. Although simple in essence, its execution can be complex and difficult. In April 1986, the Inner London Education Authority, a partner in the GLC policy, took over the Contract Compliance Unit following the GLCs abolition. Linda Smith explains the background to contract compliance, how the GLC, now ILEA, operates the policy; assesses its achievements and its significance and explores some of the lessons learnt in its three years of operation.