When adding a fuel efficient car increases an automaker's CAFE penalty

We derive the conditions that cause an automaker's Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) fine to increase when it sells an additional, fuel efficient car. Raising the CAFE standards would broaden the range of fuel economies that produce this effect. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinacy in the Linear Model: Gauss to Bose and Koopmans

Gauss showed that least squares fails to produce a unique solution only when the problem is indeterminate. This note considers his argument and the notion of indeterminacy underlying it. It also relates the argument to twentieth-century discussions of estimability and identifiability.     

Is the Well-being of Children Converging in the European Union?

Recent discussion of convergence in the European Union has focused on macroeconomic indicators, in line with requirements for participation in the single currency. But it is reduction of disparities in living standards that is an ultimate goal of European integration – the greater 'economic and social cohesion' emphasised by the Treaty on Union. We assemble evidence on whether the well-being of children in Member States has been converging over the last two decades, taking a variety of indicators: poverty, household worklessness, youth unemployment, child mortality, youth suicide, educational enrolment, teenage fertility, and self-reported 'life satisfaction'.     

Multiple Bids, Management Opposition, and the Market for Corporate Control

We use regression analysis to disentangle the wealth effect for acquired firm shareholders of management opposition and multiple bids (e.g., multiple bidders and bid revisions). Although multiple bidders and bid revisions occur more frequently for opposed acquisitions, opposition is not associated with incremental acquisition returns for acquisitions with multiple bidders. We also find that management opposition has no significant incremental effect on single bidder acquisitions unless the acquiring firm revises its initial bid. These findings indicate that rather than amplifying acqiuisition returns directly, management opposition instead serves as a negotiating tool to solicit additional bids.