Regulatory Control of the Track Access Charges of Railtrack plc

Railtrack plc, floated in 1996, was the private sector owner of Britain's railway track, signals and stations. Its major source of revenue came from track access charges, which individual train operating companies (TOCs) paid for use of the infrastructure. Since many of these TOCs received substantial subsidies to assist in paying their track access charges, Railtrack was in effect being heavily subsidised. In October 2001, the Government decided that these arrangements were no longer viable and placed Railtrack into administration. This article explains how the level of indirect subsidies to Railtrack had become excessive, and raises crucial questions that need to be addressed in settling the future shape of the railway industry.     

Contract compliance and equal opportunities

In 1983, the Greater London Council adopted a policy of 'Contract Compliance' designed to ensure that firms selling goods and services to the Council complied with its equal opportunity requirements. The initiative aroused wide interest and many other local authorities - 40 are known of to date - have been considering introducing such a policy. Although simple in essence, its execution can be complex and difficult. In April 1986, the Inner London Education Authority, a partner in the GLC policy, took over the Contract Compliance Unit following the GLCs abolition. Linda Smith explains the background to contract compliance, how the GLC, now ILEA, operates the policy; assesses its achievements and its significance and explores some of the lessons learnt in its three years of operation.     

Time Series Concepts for Conditional Distributions*

The paper asks the question – as time series analysis moves from consideration of conditional mean values and variances to unconditional distributions, do some of the familiar concepts devised for the first two moments continue to be helpful in the more general area? Most seem to generalize fairly easy, such as the concepts of breaks, seasonality, trends and regime switching. Forecasting is more difficult, as forecasts become distributions, as do forecast errors. Persistence can be defined and also common factors by using the idea of a copula. Aggregation is more difficult but causality and controllability can be defined. The study of the time series of quantiles becomes more relevant.     

WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE EURO?

The Stability Pact ‐ intended to make EMU governments run prudent budgets ‐ is losing its credibility. This article asks the question: what will happen if national debts start to rise again and some governments then have difficulty borrowing? It suggests that there will be calls for bailout, that the EU's political structures will not cope well with the resulting arguments over which countries will pay, and that the eventual and painful result will be a return to the principle that currencies and political areas coincide.     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.