Micromultinationals: Some Preliminary Evidence on an Emergent ‘Star’ of the International Entrepreneurship Field

This paper provides some preliminary evidence on the behaviour of the micromultinational, an emergent player in the international entrepreneurship field. Using survey data from the Scottish Council for Development and Industry, it found that mMNEs originate from a mixture of high and low technology sectors and employ Foreign Direct Investment as well as international contractual approaches in servicing their foreign target markets. It also concluded that micromultinationals overseas market selection decisions were mainly influenced by market- and knowledge-seeking factors rather than considerations of psychic proximity. The implications of these summary findings for policy, theory and future research are discussed in the paper.     

Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence from the Housing Market

In search markets, greater spatial concentration of sellers increases price competition. At the same time, though, a greater concentration of sellers can create a shopping externality by attracting more buyers to the site. Using housing sales data, we test for spatial competition and shopping externality effects on prices and marketing time. We find that they reflect both competitive and shopping externality effects from surrounding houses, although the relative strength varies with how fresh the house is in the market, the freshness of surrounding houses, and the phase of the market cycle. New listings have the strongest shopping externality effect on neighboring houses that have been on the market for some time. Vacant houses have their strongest competition effects in the declining market and externality effects in the rising market. Fresh houses on the market reap little benefit from shopping externalities in all phases of the market cycle.     

The Botswana Development Corporation: Divestiture policy and citizen participation in the private sector

The Botswana Development Corporation, Botswana's most important agency for industrial and commercial development, assists in the development of viable businesses, with the emphasis on profit‐making and earning acceptable returns on investment. Its policy is to divest from mature and successful ventures, ‐with the aim of raising capital for future investment, encouraging diversification and competition, and promoting citizen participation in private business ventures. The article considers the implementation of the policy with regard to two brewery companies. Its assessment is that the brewery divestments have had a positive but limited effect on economic participation by citizens and it concludes by suggesting policy and strategy reforms that would ensure sustainable private sector development.     

Heterogeneous private sector information,central bank disclosure,and stabilization policy

Conventional wisdom has it that a central bank that uses an informational advantage to undertake active policy intervention can do as well, at least so far as real outcomes are concerned, by making its information publicly available and abstaining from stabilization. This notion is examined using a framework incorporating heterogeneous private sector information concerning aggregate demand shocks. An activist regime, in which the central bank exploits its own information to engage in stabilization, is found to be unambiguously superior to a noninterventionist regime, where the central bank maintains a constant setting of policy but publicly discloses its own information.     

Royal African Company Share Prices during the South Sea Bubble

Price bubbles provide a unique opportunity to test whether investors act rationally and have sufficient knowledge of the economic environment in which they trade. We focus our attention on the 1720 South Sea bubble episode as experienced by a company not involved in governmental debt financing—the Royal African Company. Following the example of the South Sea Company, the Royal African Company lent its funds to equityholders at a preferential rate. Recognizing this benefit along with the announced dividends explains a large portion of the bubble. Furthermore, the unexplained residual does not behave like an exploding bubble, casting doubt that speculative excess motivated market participants in 1720. Our findings are indeed consistent with investor rationality, and the unexplained residual suggests that we are missing information that was available to the British financial market in 1720.     

Equilibrium and disequilibrium in the international money market

Zusammenfassung Gleichgewicht und Ungleichgewicht auf dem internationalen Geldmarkt. —In diesem Aufsatz wird versucht, die Ursache des Ungleichgewichts auf dem internationalen Geldmarkt festzustellen. Kurzfristige Kapitalbewegungen erfolgen, weil die Zinsunterschiede auf dem Geldmarkt nicht in vollem Umfang die erwarteten Wechselkurs?nderungen vorwegnehmen. Die Faktoren, die die Unterschiede in den Zinss?tzen bestimmen, sind andere als diejenigen, die den erwarteten Wechselkurs bestimmen. Als Ursachen für ein Ungleichgewicht auf dem internationalen Geldmarkt werden solche struktureller, monet?rer und institutioneller Art ermittelt. Die ersten betreffen Abweichungen von der Kauf-kraft-Parit?t und ?Fisher Open?, die zweiten Abweichungen von ?Fisher Closed? und die dritten beruhen auf der Begrenzung der Schwankungsbreite des Wechselkurses in einem entsprechenden W?hrungssystem. Die Ergebnisse sind, daβ Ungleichgewichte sowohl mit Abweichungen von der Kaufkraftparit?t als auch mit ?Fisher Open? erkl?rt werden konnten. Wechselkurs?nderungen scheinen eher strukturelle als monet?re Faktoren widerzuspiegeln. Die Zinsdifferenz ver?ndert sich nicht in Erwartung von Wechselkurs?nderungen.

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Résumé L’équilibre et le diséquilibre sur le marché international d’argent. —Cet article a essayé d’identifier les sources de diséquilibre sur le marché international d’argent. Les flux de capital à court terme se passent parce que la différence d’intérêt de marché d’argent n’anticipe pas complètement le change attendu dans le taux de change. Les facteurs déterminant la différence de taux d’intérêt se distinguent de ceux qui déterminent le taux de change anticipé. Les sources de diséquilibre sur le marché international d’argent furent identifiées comme structurelles, monétaires et institutionelles. La première comprend des déviations de la Parité de Pouvoir d’Achat et ?Fisher Open?, la deuxième comprend des déviations de ?Fisher Closed?, et la troisième comprend la confiance à un système de taux de change resserré. Les résultats sont que le diséquilibre pourrait être expliqué en manière de déviations de la Parité de Pouvoir d’Achat ou de ?Fisher Open?. Les changes de taux de change semblent refléter plus les facteurs structuraux que les facteurs monétaires. L’agio d’intérêt ne change pas en anticipation des changes de parités.

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Resumen Equilibrio y desequilibrio en el mercado internacional del dinero. —El presente artículo intenta identificar la fuente del desequilibrio en el mercado internacional del dinero. Flujos de capital de corto plazo ocurren debido a que las diferencias en la tasa de interés del mercado del dinero no anticipan completamente el cambio esperado en la tasa de cambio. Los factores que determinan la diferencia en la tasa de interés son distintos de aquéllos que determinan la tasa de interés anticipada. Las fuentes del desequilibrio en el mercado internacional del dinero fueron identificadas como estructurales, monetarias e institucionales. La primera fuente envuelve desviaciones del poder de compra de paridad y del ?Fisher Open?, la segunda envuelve desviaciones del ?Fisher Closed? y la tercera comprende la confiaza en un sistema de cambio estabilizado. Los resultados son que los desequilibrios podrían ser explicados en términos de desviaciones del poder de compra de paridad o del ?Fisher Open?. Cambios en las tasas de cambio resultan reflejar factores estructurales en vez de factores monetarios. La prima de la tasa de interés no cambia en anticipación de cambios en las paridades.

     

多种多样的新船建造融资方式

船厂建造资金的主要来源是买方提前支付合同价款,其目的是使船厂在建造项目开始时(和在船舶建造的重要阶段)获得充足的流动资金,从而能按合同约定的期限完成船舶建造,交付买方.典型的付款方式是在合同签订后,船舶买主即按合同价支付分期付款的第一笔预付款(例如合同价的10%),其余款项则应在不同的建造阶段予以支付.这些都是船舶交付前的分期付款.合同价的余额(通常为合同价的60%～80%)将在船舶交付时支付,被称为"交船时支付的尾款".