Transmission and production of information in imperfectly competitive financial markets

This paper studies the problem of information sharing among insiders in a financial market with traders who are not price takers, but act strategically. The different types of associations are ranked from the viewpoint of insiders' profits. As a byproduct, I also consider the decision problem faced by a monopolistic producer of information who is able to control the quality of the information he sells.     

Multiple equilibria in a growth model with monopolistic competition

Summary The standard neoclassical growth model is modified by introducing a market structure characterized by monopolistic competition and variable demand elasticities. In equilibrium, the price elasticity of the demand schedule facing a typical firm is a function of the aggregate savings rate. The latter feature results from an assumed wedge between the elasticity of substitution across goods in productive activities and that in consumption. In contrast with most examples in the literature our model does not require increasing returns (internal or external) in order to generate multiple equilibria.Thanks are due to Jess Benhabib, Duncan Foley, Oded Galor and participants in seminars at the Econometric Society Summer Meetings (Boston, 1993), NBER 1993 Summer Institute, CORE, UAB, and European University Institute for helpful comments.     

Gains from Wage Flexibility and the Zero Lower Bound*

We analyse the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility in the presence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on welfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment.     

Fakers becoming believers: how opinion dynamics are shaped by preference falsification,impression management and coherence heuristics

In the vast and rich literature on opinion dynamics, the role of preference falsification has generally been dismissed. Following the lead of Timur Kuran, in this paper we present one of the first multi-agent models that explores how opinion dynamics can be affected by the possible divorce between private and public opinions. It is also the first attempt to explore the role of social hierarchies in opinion dynamics conditioned by preference falsification. Our model formalizes heterogeneous evolving agents guided by a cognitively feasible set of heuristics and embedded in a social-rank-dependent structure of interactions. In social-rank-heterophilic encounters where people experience a high pressure of face-to-face interactions, unanimous support for the high social-rank preferred option emerges, while in any other scenario this option gathers majority but not unanimous support. Preference falsification has a crucial role in the emergence of unanimity, but it also creates the conditions for further private opinion actualizations that end up generating a self-sustained and sincere unanimity. When social-rank-homophilic encounters are the rule, or when group dynamics are irrelevant for opinion expression, agents never find incentives to falsify their opinions, therefore generating a social situation that resembles the general idea behind the ethnographic work of James C. Scott: true opinion expression in daily social-rank-homophilic encounters and a persistent opinion falsification in dissimilar social-rank interactions.     

Do fiscal decentralization and income inequality affect the size of the shadow economy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

In this article, we study fiscal decentralization and inequality as driving forces of the shadow economy in advanced economies. Our empirical analysis suggests that a reduction in income inequality will contain the shadow economy, whereas expenditure and tax decentralization do not significantly impact it. As decentralization is generally believed to increase government efficiency, this result is indicative of already highly efficient public administrations. Our results further indicate that redistributive policies positively affect the size of the shadow economy, whereas the tax burden does not have any discernible effect on the shadow economy in our sample.     

Mapping circular economy activities in the European Union: Patterns of implementation and their correlates in small and medium‐sized enterprises

With the European Commission looking for ways to incentivize the adoption of circular economy (CE) activities by small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in the European Union (EU), further insights into the implementation of CE activities across member states are needed. We analyse a European Commission survey conducted in 2016 among approximately 11,000 firms in EU‐28 member states in order to throw light on the conditions in which SMEs engage in five specific CE activities. In contrast to previous studies arguing that CE activities are independent of each other, we present novel findings demonstrating that seven patterns of engagement in CE can be identified in which activities are systematically interdependent. Further, we show that these patterns are associated with the organizational properties of SMEs and are differentially distributed among EU member states and industrial sectors. The interdependency of activities forms a hierarchy in which waste minimization is the most likely activity to be implemented in SMEs, followed, in descending order of likelihood, by replanning of energy use, redesigning products and services, and finally using renewable energy and replanning water usage. The findings have theoretical, managerial, and policy implications for the adoption of interdependent CE activities.     

Corporate social responsibility of financial organizations in the social economy: a case study on savings banks

The implementation of corporate social responsibility policies in firm management processes is becoming increasingly relevant. In the particular case of the financial sector, the incorporation of these policies often has huge repercussions as their role as intermediaries means that firms depend on them for investment which, in turn, affects the way firms perform. Within the financial sector, those organizations form part of the social economy—credit cooperatives and savings banks—are a very particular case as one of the principles on which they are based is their social nature. In this study, we examine the social responsibility situation in these financial organizations, focusing on the case of savings banks. We provide information that will help us better understand the real state of Spanish savings banks with respect to these two areas of social responsibility: The “Obra Social” (or charitable activities) and the incorporation of social and environmental criteria in their business policies.     

Fiber deployment in Spain

Next generation access networks will be critical for future economic growth and access to these infrastructures will have major consequences for territorial and social cohesion. This paper examines the economic and competition determinants that serve as incentives for operators to invest in fiber-to-the-home technology. We draw on a dataset comprising 6603 Spanish municipalities with access to broadband services to examine the incumbent’s (Telefónica) deployment of fiber in the period 2010–2013. We show that local loop unbundling competition had a strong positive impact on Telefónica’s fiber deployment, while bitstream competition had a negative effect. Moreover, the incumbent was more likely to invest in municipalities with a large presence of cable operators. We also consider how the municipalities’ sociodemographic characteristics affected the operator’s deployment decision. While market size and population density had a positive effect on investment, the level of unemployment and the percentage of elderly population had a negative impact.