Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets

We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson [The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design, Amer. Econ. Rev. 89 (1999) 748-780] in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants in the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences.     

An analysis of a panel of Spanish GDP forecasts

This article undertakes an analysis of the forecasts included in the Panel of Spanish Forecasts in order to highlight the fact that the predictions made and the errors committed by the entities participating on this panel contain information that is particularly useful in analysing the evolution of the Spanish economy. Here, a study is undertaken of the GDP growth forecasts for the Spanish economy for the period 2000 to 2002 made in distinct forecast time horizons. Specifically, it analyses whether the forecasts are optimistic or pessimistic and whether new information concerning the variable being predicted is used efficiently in revising earlier forecasts.     

Effects of Aspirations and Habits on the Distribution of Wealth

We analyze how the introduction of habits and aspirations affects the distribution of wealth when the labor productivity of individuals is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and when bequests arise from a joy‐of‐giving motive. In the presence of either bequests or aspirations, labor income shocks are transmitted intergenerationally, and this transmission, together with contemporaneous shocks, determines the distribution of wealth. We show that the introduction of aspirations (habits) decreases (increases) the average wealth, and increases (decreases) both its intragenerational variability and the degree of intergenerational mobility. Therefore, a distinction between aspirations and habits is relevant because they involve different implications for the distribution of wealth.     

Not just like starting over - Leadership and revivification of cooperation in groups

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over—a simple fresh start—leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new decay. Motivated by cooperation decay in organizations we study the potential of three interventions of triggering higher and sustained cooperation, which take place at the same time as a restart. Surprisingly, we find that the detailed explanation of the causes of the decay in cooperation of Fischbacher and Gächter (Am Econ Rev 100:541–556, 2010) combined with an advice on how to prevent decay do not have an effect beyond that of just starting over. In contrast, a one-way free form communication message sent by the leader to the followers strongly revives cooperation. We find evidence that repeated free form communication by the leader further strengthens the reviving effect on cooperation. Combining the two previous interventions does not outperform the pure effect of communication. Our content analysis reveals that leader communication is more people oriented than the expert advice.     

Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.     

The geographical efficiency of Spain's regional airports: A quantitative analysis

Previous studies of the role of regional airports in the Spanish economy have focused on calculating efficiency using air traffic as the output and airport infrastructure data as the input. We present an alternative quantitative analysis based upon the geographical structure within the airport's market basin. We formulate a ‘geographical efficiency’ model that considers territorial variables within the airport hinterland. Input data for our model include the socio-economic structure of the population, intermodal transport links, industrial and tourism potential and existing leisure-related services. The output is the annual number of passengers associated with such constraints. The result is a relative efficiency estimate that shows uneven patterns of geographical efficiency amongst Spain's regional airports and also provides insights into opportunities for expanding some of these critical items of infrastructure. They suggest that some of Spain's regional airports may be better placed than others to compete in a liberalized market that exhibits a clear tendency in favor of coastal, tourism-based airports.     

The limitations of community-based tourism as an instrument of development cooperation: the value of the Social Vocation of the Territory concept

This paper contributes to the debate over the validity of community-based tourism (CBT) as a development and poverty-reduction strategy in the rural-peasant world. In this debate, researchers tend to compare and contrast specific experiences on which they have conducted field work. This implies limitations in the analysis: conclusions may be biased, leading to circular unresolved discussions. This paper introduces a structural analysis, to discover whether CBT has intrinsic characteristics which mean that as an instrument of development cooperation it increases the risks typically involved in social intervention. It applies the concept of the Social Vocation of the Territory (SVT), adapted from Land Suitability concepts used in geography and environmental studies. SVT is a historical process in which land and local society adapt over time to reach equilibrium in specific uses of natural and social resources. Employing this concept on South American case studies, this paper concludes that CBT can have limitations as an instrument of development cooperation and poverty reduction, because of increasing peasant differentiation, social unrest, problems with local decision-making, lack of local tourism business knowledge and training, pseudo-participation, and work and time restructuring. Use of the SVT concept can help CBT in certain very specific circumstances.