征占用林地生态公益林价值评估的探讨

国家重点工程建设常常需要征占用生态公益林的林地.在进行补偿时,如何评估此生态公益林林木的价值呢?不同评估方法,其评估价值有很大的差异.本文将征占用林地的天然生态公益林的评估价值定为以培育中径材为目标的同类林分用材林评估价值的三倍至五倍.作者认为这样的评估价值最接近现行市场交易价,能够为征占用单位和林木所有者所接受.     

加大关键性领域改革力度奠定经济发展体制基础

2005年,是我国改革与发展继往开来的重要年份。我国将要完成“十五”规划提出的各项主要任务,并向全面建设小康社会的第二个五年迈进;同时,加入世贸组织的三年过渡期基本结束,开始跨进范围更广、层次更深的开放型经济。2005年能否保持经济平稳较快增长,不仅关乎年度宏观经济稳定,而且涉及能否为“十一五”期间奠定坚实的、可持续的基础,甚至将影响到整个“十一五”时期的经济走势。因此,今年经济工作不仅应实现年度宏观调控的四大目标(经济增长、物价稳定、就业增加和国际收支基本平衡),而且还要为延长经济上升期创造有利条件。一、目前我国…     

Lies,damned lies and statistics: the accuracy of survey responses

That survey research is error prone is not a new idea and different varieties of non-sampling error have been investigated in the literature as well as consideration being given in many statistics textbooks to the issue of sampling error. The paper here considers research upon corporate environmental reporting. It compares information provided by corporate environmental reports with information that survey respondents claim their organization’s environmental report contains. This enables the accuracy of the claims to be assessed. Consideration is given to two different industries the Water industry and the Energy industry. Errors due to inaccurate reporting by survey respondents are shown to be relatively infrequent and respondents appear just about as likely to claim they report information that they do not, in fact, report as to fail to indicate that they report information that is, in fact, actually reported.     

票据无权代理追认制度微探

票据行为是一种法律行为，自然也可以以代理方式为之。民法上有关代理制度的规则一般也都可以适用于票据代理行为。但由于民法与商事法的立法旨趣各有侧重，为促进票据流通、保障交易安全，票据代理不能照搬民法上关于代理制度的规定。票据的无权代理是票据代理中一个非常典型的问题，与民法上的无权代理区别很大，其中存在的问题很多。对于票据的无权代理中是否应当赋予本人以追认权，多数大陆法系国家的立法例与英美法系国家之立法例有所不同。     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.     

Risk Sharing in a World with Processing Costs: Trading versus Banking

We analyze the bank versus exchange problem in a Diamond Dybvig (1983) economy with exogenous transaction processing costs. We find that processing costs in the market enables the bank to overcome the side trade threat ( Jacklin (1987) ) and offer some desirable liquidity insurance. Moreover, in the bank equilibrium processing costs are proportional to consumption, while in the market economy early and late consumers incur equal costs. These two effects explain that for a given level of aggregate processing costs, the bank economy is superior. On the other hand, the number of transactions in the bank economy is larger. It is for this reason that if processing costs are proportional to transaction value, and independent of the mechanism used, the exchange economy is superior.