E-banking comes to town: Exploring how traditional UK high street banks are meeting the challenge of technology and virtual relationships

UK high street banks are continuing to extend the choice of channel through which customers can manage their moneycolon; an obvious example is e-banking. They have been keen to exploit technological advances and changing customer attitudes to alternative channels. Additionally, competition from leaner new market entrants has provided an added incentive to adopt new approaches. In the light of such developments, it is worth reflecting on the changing nature of the bank–customer relationship. This paper suggests that banks are finding it difficult to manage relationships effectively due, in large measure, to the sheer volume of customer data generated by new interactive, technology-based channels. Paradoxically, it seems that the more data banks have about customers the less likely they are to know them on a personal level. It is further suggested that channels such as e-banking potentially reduce the level of personal contact between bank and customer to the extent that a ‘virtual’ relationship develops. This paper concludes that, given the tendency towards ‘virtualisation’, it is inconceivable that bank–customer relationships will become any more intimate in the future. Indeed, a greater degree of personalisation in customer communication may be the very best that banks are able to offer.     

There's something about saving …

The paper considers how people should plan their saving, given certain assumptions about inheritance and changes in household circumstances. The results are produced by a model that takes into account tax and state benefits as well as various private savings vehicles. It concludes that, for many households, saving for retirement through a ‘pension’ might not be optimum and that the best strategy is to vary the incidence and allocation of saving in response to changes in household circumstances.     

Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets

We study an oligopolistic industry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kind of Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition and Cournot can be sustained in equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and sell in the futures market. These results suggest, contrary to existing literature, that the introduction of futures markets may have an anti-competitive effect.