Regulation And The Rise In Asset-Based Mutual Fund Management Fees

In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.     

Optimal Collective Investment in Generic Advertising, Export Market Promotion and Cost-of-Production-Reducing Research

Optimal investment rules are developed for a producer agency investing in domestic-market generic advertising, export market promotion, and cost-of-production-reducing research. These rules are derived assuming either maximization of producers' surplus or social surplus. The form of the optimality rules differs according to which objective is pursued. Fixed producer agency budgets are also allowed by incorporating a constraint limiting total expenditure on the three activities. Addition of such a constraint substantially alters the structure of the optimal investment rules. Differences in these rules highlight the importance of accounting for the financing mechanism when modeling optimal checkoff fund investment decisions. Optimality rules are simulated using data for the Canadian beef sector. Results suggest historic underinvestment in domestic-market generic advertising but overinvestment in export market promotion. Sensitivity of simulation results underscores the difficulty in assessing optimality of historic producer investment in cost-of-production-reducing research.     

The Structural Relation Between Mortgage and Market Interest Rates

This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between primary and secondary mortgage markets and the short-term and long-term market interest rates. Using a series of monthly data on fixed rate mortgage rates and GNMA rates, we explore the dependence and speed of adjustment in these primary and secondary mortgage rates to each other as well as to the long and short-term government rates. The results indicate that residential mortgage rates in general, appear to follow the long-term rate and are not very sensitive to movements in the short-term interest rate.     

North-South interdependence: An economic-physical interpretation

Summary The article gives a physical-economic interpretation to a number of economic North-South interdependent relations. Basic research evidence at the man-machine level was an inspiration; the output could only be expressed in physical specification terms. The corresponding generalizations are in product complexity, speciality terms also. This terminology is conducive to far-ranging extrapolations and generalizations. It eliminates the problem of pricing at the product level for all aggregation levels; therefore the fundamental economic relations are better expressed. The article concludes with a mega extrapolation in graphical terms, which relates the product and implied technological capability in the world, expressed in physical terms, for country groups ordered by three development levels. Correspondingly the comparative advantage and inter-industry trade areas at the world product level are shown.The author acknowledges valid comments of two anonymous referees and financial support by DGIS to the Technology Scientific Foundation for the research of which this paper reports certain aspects only. This paper came out as a working paper TSF 84-1. An earlier version was presented at the International Economic Association Meeting in Madrid, Sept. 1983. Clearly, only the author bears responsibility for the ideas and interpretations presented in the following text.     

Early evidence of an adverse selection death spiral? The case of Blue Cross and Blue Shield

This paper uses a unique data set from 1957 to examine whether or not Blue Cross and Blue Shield suffered from an adverse selection death spiral after for-profit commercial insurance companies entered the market for health insurance. Results suggest that moving to experience rating may have helped the Blues counteract adverse selection in the group health insurance market. Adverse selection posed a greater problem for the Blues in the market for individual health insurance, possibly because of differences in the way the Blues screened potential enrollees relative to commercial insurance companies.