Managing uncertainty in on-demand air travel

Fractional management companies (FMCs) that provide on-demand air travel services experience frequent changes in aircraft availability and flight requests. We propose scheduling heuristics which are both cost-effective and persistent (i.e., close to the original schedule) to address the uncertainty. The heuristics include pro-actively enforcing idleness of aircraft in creating the original schedule, strategically repositioning aircraft to serve yet-unknown demand and dense scheduling. Computational experiments are conducted in a simulator that mimics FMCs’ daily operations. Simulation results quantify the value of each heuristic, which can be easily incorporated into existing computational methods used in FMCs for static scheduling problems.     

Road accessibility and cohesion in lagging regions: Empirical evidence from Portugal based on spatial econometric models

A number of transportation infrastructure projects were conducted in Europe during the 1990s with the explicit objective of promoting regional cohesion goals through the improvement of the accessibility of peripheral regions. Given its peripheral situation in the Union, Portugal was a key target for some of these projects. A decade later, it is pertinent to ask whether the new infrastructure achieved its objective of promoting lagging regions. The objective of this paper is to analyze one of the lagging regions in Portugal, to try to establish the link between changes in accessibility levels brought by improvements in the transportation network, and two indicators commonly used in accessibility research (population and purchasing power), while controlling other variables of possible relevance, such as the levels of educational achievement of the population in the region. The analysis is based on the use of spatially autoregressive models which allow the representation of accessibility as spatially lagged variables of first and second order. The results place the contribution of accessibility changes in context, and point at the relevance of education as an alternative policy.     

Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness

Hedonic pricing with quasi-linear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge–Kantorovich) linear programming problem. Optimal assignments in the latter correspond to stable matchings, and to hedonic equilibria. These assignments are shown to exist in great generality; their marginal indirect payoffs with respect to agent type are shown to be unique whenever direct payoffs vary smoothly with type. Under a generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition (also known as a twist condition) the assignments are shown to be unique and to be pure, meaning the matching is one-to-one outside a negligible set. For smooth problems set on compact, connected type spaces such as the circle, there is a topological obstruction to purity, but we give a weaker condition still guaranteeing uniqueness of the stable match.     

Further evidence of the determinants of industrial research and development using single and simultaneous equation models

This paper provides empirical evidence in favor of the Schumpeterian hypothesis using single equation models. A simultaneous equation model is then developed which examines the interaction of R & D, growth and profitability.     

Perfect and Proper Equilibria of Large Games

This paper deals with the existence and other related issues of perfect and proper equilibria of games with a continuum of players. A sufficient condition for the existence of a perfect (proper) equilibrium as an almost everywhere limit of a sequence of ε-perfect (ε-proper) equilibria is given. An example shows that almost everywhere convergence need not obtain if the condition is violated. Extension to the case where the set of actions available to the players can differ is discussed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C79.