Environmental regulatory enforcement with “green” consumers

We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions     

Why (not) cooperate? A cognitive model of farmers’ intention to join producer groups in Romania

After the breakdown of the communist regime in Romania, collective farms were replaced by a large number of small-scale private farms. Although cooperation seems to be a favourable choice for these smallholders, it did not develop as perhaps expected. This article explores the factors that determine the formation of the intention of Romanian vegetable farmers to join marketing cooperatives in the form of so called producer groups. Our theoretical framework refers to Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour, which we model with a structural equation model. We identified as main intention drivers the expectation for better prices and easier access to capital. Perceived family support is another significant factor. The level of distrust is high. Although our trust variable is not significant as a predictor of the intention to cooperate in the model, we find qualitative indications that trust plays a role when the intention is translated into actual behaviour.     

Editors’ note

Portuguese Economic Journal -     

Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance

We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms’ incentives to invest, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications.     

International trade,job training,and labor reallocation

A large literature studies the impact of increased import competition on workers' outcomes, however, relatively few studies examine which policies can aid workers displaced by trade. In this article, we evaluate the impact of an industrial job training program in Brazil on workers displaced from manufacturing sectors. We find that industrial training increases the probability of re-entry into the formal labor market 1 year after displacement by about 17 percentage points and is even more effective for workers displaced from sectors exposed to high import competition. This effect is mainly associated with workers switching sectors and occupations after training.     

On the risk premium in Nordic electricity futures prices

This paper examines empirically the relationship between electricity spot and futures prices, by analysing a decade of data for a set of short term-to-maturity futures contracts traded in the Nordic Power Exchange. It is found that, on average, there are significant positive risk premiums in short-term electricity futures prices. The significance and size of the premiums, however, varies seasonally over the year; whereas it is greatest during winter, it is zero in summer. It is also found that time-varying risk premiums are significantly related to unexpectedly low reservoir levels. Furthermore, before the unprecedented supply-shock that hit the market around the end of year 2002, the risk premiums were related to the variance and the skewness of future spot prices.     

Noncentral bimatrix variate generalised beta distributions

In this paper, we determine the density functions of nonsymmetrised doubly noncentral matrix variate beta type I and II distributions. The nonsymmetrised density functions of doubly noncentral and noncentral bimatrix variate generalised beta type I and II distributions are also obtained.     

The influence of variables of attitude on collective entrepreneurship

In the current global corporate climate that surrounds us, firms would do well to encourage the talent and creativity of their employees in order to achieve success. This is achieved, not by giving priority to individual talent, but by optimizing the collective as a whole and the firm’s activity based on team work and joint effort. Heads of organizations might benefit from creating a favorable context for the birth and growth of collective internal cooperation, which is understood to be the collective ability to create and innovate on the part of the team, the firm or the organization. Having contrasted our hypotheses through research on Spanish firms, we have concluded that job satisfaction and commitment to the team are factors that have a direct and positive effect on collective entrepreneurship.     

Comparing IV with structural models: What simple IV can and cannot identify

This paper compares the economic questions addressed by instrumental variables estimators with those addressed by structural approaches. We discuss Marschak’s Maxim: estimators should be selected on the basis of their ability to answer well-posed economic problems with minimal assumptions. A key identifying assumption that allows structural methods to be more informative than IV can be tested with data and does not have to be imposed.