地方政府利益、地方政府行为与经济增长

目前,对中国地方政府的经济行为的研究强调了在经济转型过程中地方政府在多样化的地方经济发展模式中的主导作用,注意到了地方政府目标的多重性,本地区社会福利最大化,政府利益最大化以及中央政府的满意程度等。对地方政府在公共产品的提供、就业、收入分配、实现社会公平等方面行为不到位方面的研究是从定性方法来论证。本文试图在定性分析基础上建立一些基本的数学模型为将来的计量研究提供一个模型框架。     

AHP在生产企业构建电子废弃物逆向物流体系中的应用

电子废弃物逆向物流指电子产品从消费者返回到生产者的物流过程。随着经济的发展，中国电子废弃物数量急剧上升，并对生态环境造成巨大的破坏。同时，电子废弃物逆向物流的实施可以带来巨大的经济效益。此外，发达国家封电子废弃物的规制政策对中国电子产品生产企业产生了极大影响。在上述背景下，探讨生产企业如何构建电子废弃物逆向物流系统，进行相关指标分析及通过层次分析法作出模式选择有着重要的现实意义。     

Effect of diversification on capital structure

Previous empirical financial studies have paid little attention to the role of diversification strategy on financial choices. This study analyses the financing strategies of multibusiness firms, suggesting the relevance of sorting the diversification phenomena into its related and unrelated components. The implications of our findings are important because they explain earlier contradictory results on capital‐structure determinants and offer an explanation of how the degree of product specialization/diversification and the direction of diversification (related or unrelated) translate into different corporate financial behaviours.     

Do Japanese CEOs matter?

In a country where individualism is emphasized less than in Western countries, we ask whether the CEO (shacho) of a Japanese corporation positively affects firm performance. To answer this question, we construct a shacho-firm matched panel data set in the period 1990 through 2002 of all listed 1419 Japanese manufacturing firms and their 3520 shachos. Though we find a positive abnormal stock return on the date a shacho change is announced, especially when the shacho change is non-routine, we document that this effect is short-lived. There seems to be no long-run positive change in performance or policies after a shacho change, even when the shacho change is non-routine. Finally, in trying to explain firm performance or policies, we attempt to separate a firm-fixed effect from a shacho-fixed effect, and are unable to disentangle a shacho-fixed effect. We are thus left to conclude that shachos do not positively matter in the Japanese corporation in this decade of a stagnant economy.     

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT,INTERNALIZATION, AND U.S. ACQUIRER GAINS IN FOREIGN TAKEOVERS

In examining takeovers of foreign targets by U.S. firms, we investigate the effect of the target country's legal environment on acquiring firm value. Our results indicate that acquirers of target firms located in civil law countries experience significant positive abnormal returns, especially when the acquirer possesses a high level of intangibles. Furthermore, we find that acquirers with high levels of intangibles are more likely to acquire target firms in civil law countries. These findings suggest that the transfer of intangibles overseas provides relatively larger efficiency benefits for multinational corporations in cases where the alternative, contracting in external markets, is more difficult.     

Making Sense of One Dollar CEO Salaries

We examine the determinants and outcomes of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) accepting a $1 salary, a compensation practice that occurs relatively frequently in high‐profile firms and is debated by regulators, investors, and the media. Using a hand‐collected sample of 93 CEOs from 91 firms between 1993 and 2011, we examine the triggers preceding the $1 salary decision, the factors associated with the decision, subsequent stock returns, and the outcomes for the CEOs. Our evidence is consistent with two explanations for the phenomenon: (i) it is a gesture of sacrifice by CEOs of firms in crisis, and (ii) it is a signal of better future performance by CEOs of growing firms. Our analyses highlight the two different circumstances and shed light on an interesting debate that has thus far been supported only by anecdotal evidence.     

Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?

We test the influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common value predicts that more informed bidders may pay a lower price. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We assume that blockholders of the target's shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Our empirical results show that blockholders pay a much lower premium than do other buyers