Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?*

In this paper, we consider an environment where individual actions have externalities and two types of agents exist: agents with social preferences (the good) and selfish agents. Selfish agents have pay‐off functions that do not take into account social welfare. The pay‐off of an agent is a linear combination of social welfare and the pay‐off of a selfish agent. We demonstrate that the corrective tax rates that maximize social welfare do not depend on the degree of social preferences. Hence, the good and the selfish should not be taxed differently.     

An empirical analysis of international labour migration in the Philippines

This study empirically investigates the impact of economic, demographic, and political factors on the size of emigration from the Philippines. In 2007, overseas workers from the Philippines sent remittances in excess of US$14 billion annually to their families back home. Although these remittances are an important source of foreign exchange and play an important role in economic development, the determinants of emigration in the Philippines are not well established. A simple unrestricted error correction model of migration was specified and estimated using data spanning the period 1975–2005. Results indicate that the level of unemployment, adult literacy and population density are the key determinants of emigration in the Philippines. The result also indicates that government instability impacts negatively on emigration in the Philippines. The policy implications of the results are discussed.     

Should public policy respond to positional externalities?

A nice suit is one that compares favorably with those worn by others in the same local environment. More generally, a positional good is one whose utility depends strongly on how it compares with others in the same category.¹A positional externality occurs when new purchases alter the relevant context within which an existing positional good is evaluated.² For example, if some job candidates begin wearing expensive custom-tailored suits, a side effect of their action is that other candidates become less likely to make favorable impressions on interviewers. From any individual job seeker's point of view, the best response might be to match the higher expenditures of others, lest her chances of landing the job fall. But this outcome may be inefficient, since when all spend more, each candidate's probability of success remains unchanged. All may agree that some form of collective restraint on expenditure would be useful.In such cases, however, it is often impractical to negotiate private solutions. Do positional externalities then become legitimate objects of public policy concern? In attempting to answer this question, I employ the classical libertarian criterion put forth by John Stuart Mill³, who wrote the state may not legitimately constrain any citizen's freedom of action except to prevent harm to others. I argue that many positional externalities appear to meet Mill's test, causing not just negative feelings but also large and tangible economic costs to others who are ill-equipped to avoid them. I also discuss an unintrusive policy remedy for positional externalities, one modeled after the use of effluent charges to curb environmental pollution.The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 notes the deep similarity between the conditions that give rise to positional arms races and those that give rise to conventional military arms races. Section 2 follows with a review of evidence concerning the strength of concerns about relative position. Section 3 describes some of the tangible economic costs that people experience as a result of positional externalities arising from such concerns. Section 4 takes up the question of whether collective action directed against positional externalities is consistent with respect for individual rights. Section 5 describes how a progressive consumption tax could neutralize many of the most costly effects of positional externalities.     

The measurement of Poverty: An experimental questionnaire investigation

We re-examine some of the standard axioms used in the literature on poverty measurement. Using a sample of 486 students from Australia, Israel and the USA we investigate the extent to which individuals' perceptions of poverty correspond to the axioms. We find that axioms such as anonymity, growth of the poor and monotonicity are resonably well supported. However there is very little support for the focus axiom and the principle of transfers was the least well supported of the eight specific criteria for poverty measurement that we examined.     

Selective hedging with market views and risk limits: the case of Hydro-Quebec

This study presents how Hydro-Quebec manages its short-term financial risks. The quantitative hedging model is articulated over forward and volatility premia and constrained by a yearly risk limit provided by the firm's Finance Committee. The hedging solutions provide the optimal linear hedging parameters and option strike levels. The second part of the paper is devoted to a theoretical analysis of the sensitivity of the optimal solutions to changes in the premia, by means of the general implicit function theorem.     

Improving the performance of random coefficients demand models: The role of optimal instruments

We shed new light on the performance of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes’ (1995) GMM estimator of the aggregate random coefficient logit model. Based on an extensive Monte Carlo study, we show that the use of Chamberlain’s (1987) optimal instruments overcomes many problems that have recently been documented with standard, non-optimal instruments. Optimal instruments reduce small sample bias, but they prove even more powerful in increasing the estimator’s efficiency and stability. We consider a wide variety of data-generating processes and an empirical application to the automobile market. We also consider the gains of other recent methodological advances when combined with optimal instruments.     

A model to evaluate the effectiveness of enterprise training programmes

This paper describes a model developed to measure customer satisfaction with enterprise training programmes. Based on developments in customer satisfaction and quality measurement, it is proposed as an alternative to the training evaluation model developed by Kirkpatrick (1959). A single indicator, a Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI), quantifies the level of satisfaction with each training programme. The model also measures the individual parameters that contribute to the CSI, as well as their relative importance. It facilitates a benchmarking process regarding these parameters and between training programmes. The development process of the model is described, as is its use in practice.     

Parallel Trade and its Ambiguous Effects on Global Welfare

The regulation of parallel trade is a fiercely debated issue in the global trading system. This paper investigates the welfare effects of parallel trade freedom for different levels of trade costs and market size. It is found that parallel trade freedom has a positive effect on global welfare if countries are sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of market size and trade costs are sufficiently low. Contrary to intuition, this result even holds in a situation where parallel trade freedom implies the closure of the smaller market. If, however, countries are virtually homogenous in terms of market size, parallel trade freedom may be detrimental to global welfare for specific levels of trade costs.