R&D Partnerships and Innovation Performance: Can There Be too Much of a Good Thing?

R&D collaboration facilitates the pooling of complementary skills, learning from the partner as well as the sharing of risks and costs. Research therefore stresses the positive relationship between collaborative R&D and innovation performance. Fewer studies address the potential drawbacks of collaborative R&D. Collaborative R&D comes at the cost of coordination and monitoring, requires knowledge disclosure, and involves the risk of opportunistic behavior by the partners. Thus, while for lower collaboration intensities the net gains can be high, costs may start to outweigh benefits if firms perform a higher share of their innovation projects collaboratively. For a sample of 2735 firms located in Germany and active in a broad range of manufacturing and service sectors, this study finds that increasing the share of collaborative R&D projects in total R&D projects is associated with a higher probability of product innovation and with a higher market success of new products. While this confirms previous findings on the gains for innovation performance, the results also show that collaboration has decreasing and even negative returns on product innovation if its intensity increases above a certain threshold. Thus, the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation follows an inverted‐U shape and, on average, costs start to outweigh benefits if a firm pursues more than about two‐thirds of its R&D projects in collaboration. This result is robust to conditioning market success to the introduction of new products and to accounting for the selection into collaborating. This threshold is, however, contingent on firm characteristics. Smaller and younger as well as resource‐constrained firms benefit from relatively higher collaboration intensities. For firms with higher collaboration complexities in terms of different partners and different stages of the R&D process at which collaboration takes place, returns start to decrease already at lower collaboration intensities.     

When Do Analysts Adjust for Biases in Management Guidance? Effects of Guidance Track Record and Analysts’ Incentives

Prior research indicates that analysts do not fully adjust for the general downward bias in earnings guidance issued by management. We report the results of two experiments designed to investigate how guidance track record and analysts’ incentives jointly explain the extent to which analysts adjust for guidance bias. Our results suggest that analysts with accuracy incentives adjust for management’s track record of downwardly biased guidance when the bias is relatively small (one cent), but those with relationship incentives do not. Furthermore, the difference in adjustment is larger when the bias track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. Also, when guidance bias is larger (two cents) relative to smaller (one cent), analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust, as they appear to strike a balance between accuracy and their desire to please management. These findings hold implications for investors, regulators, and the interpretation of prior research.     

Do Analysts Matter for Corporate Tax Planning? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

We exploit an exogenous shock to analyst coverage as a result of brokerage house mergers and closures to examine whether financial analysts influence the tax‐planning activities of the firms they cover. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that, on average, firms affected by broker mergers and/or closures experience a reduction in their GAAP (cash) effective tax rates (ETR) of 2.5 percent (2.6 percent), relative to control firms, translating into average tax expense (cash tax) savings of $34 ($35) million. The treatment effect is more pronounced among firms with lower pre‐event analyst coverage. To explore how analysts affect tax planning, we further document that the treatment effect is greater among firms that lose an analyst who provided an implied ETR forecast in the past, suggesting that analysts influence tax planning via their tax‐specific research efforts. In addition, we find that after merger/closure, weakly governed firms increase their use of aggressive tax strategies, and financially distressed firms experience a larger reduction of cash effective tax rates, relative to control firms. Overall, we provide evidence that a shock to analyst coverage sufficiently changes the cost‐benefit trade‐off of tax planning.     

Sources of Real Exchange Rate Volatility in Africa: The Case of ECOWAS*

Abstract: This study examines the impact of (real) demand shocks, (aggregate) supply shocks, and monetary shocks on real exchange rates in 13 West African countries. We observe that the real demand shocks explain most of the fluctuations in real exchange rates in all these countries. Accordingly, policymakers should adopt a careful demand management strategy by controlling government expenditure and taxes.     

The price of Cherokee removal

In this paper, we estimate the social costs and income transfers of Cherokee removal, i.e., “The Trail of Tears.” Our cost estimates provide several new insights into this extensively studied topic. First, our estimate of the number of removal-related fatalities is considerably lower than the commonly accepted figure of 4000. Second, the uncompensated value of ceded Cherokee land in the southeast was the largest cost borne by the Cherokees, followed in magnitude by the value of lost agricultural output due to removal. Third, American taxpayers paid for roughly 44% of the total social costs of removal. Also, the cost burden of Cherokee removal, as a share of 1 year's GDP, was greater for the Cherokees than the cost burden of any major war for the American population.     

Mozambique Metical Exchange Rate Dynamics: Evidence of Fractional Co‐Integration in the USA and South African Rates

This paper studies the exchange rate dynamics of the Mozambique metical with respect to the US dollar and the South African rand. However, instead of using standard I(0)/I(1) techniques, we use long memory and fractionally integrated and co‐integrated models. Our results indicate that the two exchange rates are highly persistent, with orders of integration equal to or above 1. They also seem to be co‐integrated, with an order of integration close to albeit above 0 but with an AR coefficient very close to 1. Thus, although the two series seem to be fractionally co‐integrated, shocks in the long‐run relationship between the two variables are persistent and take a long time to disappear.     

Binding constraints to productive investment in Malawi: A modified HRV framework

The paper applies a modified Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (HRV) growth diagnostics framework to analyse Malawi's growth challenges. The study finds five critical binding constraints affecting productive investment and output growth in Malawi. These include land administration, taxation, customs and trade regulations, political governance, and cost‐of‐finance. Land constraints are evidenced by highly urban and rural population growth, an inverse co‐movement between the rural population and investment per capita, and low land administration indices. Tax constraints are evidenced by the negative growth of investment per capita. Customs and trade regulations constraints are evidenced by nontariff measures, such as high costs and the time it takes to export and import. Political governance constraints are evidenced by rising government debt and the low score on transparency, accountability, and corruption based on the World Bank's Public Transparency Scale. Lastly, high cost‐of‐finance constraints are evidenced by monetary policy challenges, such as high real interest rates, inflation rate, uncompetitive exchange rate, and foreign aid ineffectiveness. Therefore, we recommend that the formulation of crucial policy strategies to alleviate these five significant binding constraints be encouraged. The government should base such an approach to sound growth therapeutics that fully account for each challenge's root causes.     

When it pays to have a friend on the inside: contingent effects of buyer advocacy on B2B suppliers

As organizational buying systems grow more complex and sophisticated, suppliers increasingly rely on buyer advocacy: an individual buyer’s efforts to influence his/her colleagues such that the supplier’s standing is improved. Drawing from cognitive response theory, the authors hypothesize an inverted U-shaped relationship between a buyer’s advocacy for a supplier and the customer’s purchases from that supplier. They theorize that this effect is moderated by the advocate’s industry experience and customer–supplier relationship characteristics. An analysis of multisource data from a B2B service provider (Study 1) supports the predicted inverted U-shaped relationship, while a unique dataset from a large industrial supplier (Study 2) provides broad support for the hypothesized moderators. Finally, a randomized experiment (Study 3) replicates key findings and corroborates the theorized cognitive response mechanisms. Findings contribute to the limited literature on buyer advocacy within the organizational buying domain and offer practical implications for suppliers and buyers.