排序方式: 共有22条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
21.
Amar Cheema Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc Rajesh Bagchi Richard P. Bagozzi James C. Cox Utpal M. Dholakia Eric A. Greenleaf Amit Pazgal Michael H. Rothkopf Michael Shen Shyam Sunder Robert Zeithammer 《Marketing Letters》2005,16(3-4):401-413
With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic,
social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior
in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models
of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms.
This paper is based on the special session at the 6th Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium, University of Colorado Boulder,
June 2004 (co-chaired by the first two authors). 相似文献
22.
The theoretical literature demonstrates that excess capacity is not an equilibrium phenomenon if each firm’s marginal revenue decreases with the competitor’s output. We show that such a conclusion can be overturned in the presence of technology licensing. We show that in the presence of technology licensing, a firm may hold excess capacity because it increases the benefit from technology licensing. 相似文献