Cooperative strategy and new venture performance: The role of business strategy and management experience

This paper reports the results of a study of new ventures which examine the relationships between performance and the experience of a new venture's management team, its choice of competitive strategy, and its use of various cooperative arrangements. The findings of the moderated regression analysis indicate that cooperative arrangements are most beneficial to those new ventures whose management teams possess the most experience.     

Perceived Environmental Dynamism and Managerial Risk Aversion as Antecedents of Manufacturing Outsourcing: The Moderating Effects of Firm Maturity

This study investigates how perceived environmental dynamism and managerial risk aversion influence a firm's manufacturing outsourcing activities. Based on a survey of 86 small manufacturing firms, the study found that higher levels of perceived environmental dynamism and managerial risk aversion are associated with increased outsourcing activity. These relationships are moderated by firm maturity such that newer firms engage in more manufacturing outsourcing than their mature counterparts when the environment is perceived to be more dynamic. Mature firms were found to outsource more than newer firms when their top-management teams were relatively more risk averse.     

THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

This article examines economic sanctions from an ethical perspective. Utilitarian ethics and rights theory are applied to economic sanctions in general. Special attention is paid to the economic sanctions imposed against Iraq and Cuba. The conclusion is that economic sanctions are very difficult to justify on any grounds and have negative consequences. Sanctions should not be used as a tool of international relations.     

Influence of buyer ethics and salesperson behavior on intention to choose a supplier

A survey of purchasing professionals was conducted to investigate the effect of perceived unethical salesperson behavior on intentions to choose a supplier. Results suggest that as salesperson behavior is perceived as more unethical, the purchaser is less likely to choose the firm that the salesperson represents. This result is due to norm violations influencing intentions in two ways: (1) through externally controlled rewards or punishments (e.g., harming the purchaser’s career), and (2) through internally self-bestowed rewards or punishments (e.g., feeling bad for not doing the “right” thing).     

Twenty-Ninth International Atlantic Economic Conference March 17–23, 1990 Geneva

Twenty-Ninth International Atlantic Economic Conference March 17–23, 1990 Geneva     

Time Orientation and Attitudes toward Advertising in a High-Context Culture: An Empirical Study of Macau

Each culture has its own dominant construct of time that influences the value placed on the use of time by individuals. This empirical study examines how time orientations influence attitudes toward advertising in a high-context culture of an Asian economy. Data was collected through surveys in Macau. Findings show that Macanese are more future orientated but less enthusiastic towards advertising; they switch to another channel and engage in other activities during commercial breaks. Results also show that past orientation has the strongest impact on advertising avoidance. The authors offer managerial implications for the development of effective advertising programs in this emerging market.     

Personality and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games

We investigate the role personality plays in Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (FRPD) games. Even after controlling for demographic factors such as race, course of study, and cognitive ability, we find that cooperative behavior is significantly related to the Big Five personality trait Agreeableness. A one standard deviation increase in agreeableness increases the predicted probability of cooperation by a subject with modal demographic characteristics from 67.9% to 80.6%.     

Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions

Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey in J Finance 16(1):8–37, 1961), but repeated experimental studies find more overbidding than underbidding. We propose a model of optimistically irrational bidders who understand that there are possible gains and losses associated with higher bids but who may overestimate the additional probability of winning and/or underestimate the potential losses when bidding above value. These bidders may fail to discover the dominant strategy—despite the fact that the dominant strategy only requires rationality from bidders—but respond in a common sense way to out-of-equilibrium outcomes. By varying the monetary consequences of losing money in experimental auctions we observe more overbidding when the cost to losing money is low, and less overbidding when the cost is high. Our findings lend themselves to models in which less than fully rational bidders respond systematically to out-of-equilibrium incentives, and we find that our model better fits the effects of our manipulations than most of the existing models we consider.     

Brussels,Belgium thirty-fifth international Atlantic Economic conference April 7–14, 1993

Brussels, Belgium thirty-fifth international Atlantic Economic conference April 7–14, 1993