Calculating, With Income Effects, the Compensating Variation for a State Change

One can easily obtain exact closed-form solutions for the compensating variation (and equivalent variation) in the presence of income effects when the policy being evaluated can be described as a change in the state of the world and one is willing to assume the policy change does not change the individual’s epsilon draw. Alternatively, if one assumes the policy changes the epsilon draw, the expectation of the compensating variation is a complicated integral, typically without a closed-form. The assumption that the policy does not affect one’s epsilon draw is common, and often reasonable, but little discussed.     

An in-depth investigation of student information gathering meetings with stakeholders and domain experts

International Journal of Technology and Design Education - Information gathering activities in engineering design projects play an important role in the identification and definition of stakeholder...     

The impact of monitor choice on insurer loss reserves

This paper examines the association between monitoring and earnings management by property-casualty insurers. Prior literature has evaluated the impact of auditors and actuaries on insurer reserving. We extend this work by considering the nonrandom nature of monitor assignment. We model the insurer decisions regarding choice of auditor and actuary jointly using a Heckman selection model. Consistent with prior literature, we account for potential loss reserving incentives that may confound these decisions. We find that the use of internal actuaries is significantly related to higher reserve errors, but this is reduced, but not fully offset, when the internal actuary is an officer of the insurer. We find lower reserve error for auditors from a Big N firm. However, the use of an auditor and actuary from the same Big N firm is significantly related to higher reserve errors.