Negotiated tariffs in free entry oligopoly under integrated markets

Using the Nash bargaining approach, this paper analyzes the negotiation of tariffs between two countries in free-entry oligopolies under integrated markets. Employing a symmetric model with linear demand and cost functions, the paper shows that for both countries Pareto-efficient negotiated tariffs are larger than the tariffs at the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative tariff game (tariff war) in which each country imposes its optimum tariff.     

Does policy reform promote FDI in developing economies? a firm-level simulation approach

How do policy reforms for foreign investors in developing economies affect inward foreign direct investment? Using a firm heterogeneity model calibrated to match data on Japanese multinational firms, we simulate how multinationals respond to a decline in investment procedure days. We find that such policy reforms in investment procedures significantly increase the aggregate entries and sales of multinational firms in developing economies, with the more pronounced impact at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin. At the firm level, declining entry costs encourage more productive firms to invest in a wider range of markets although such impacts are modest for the most productive firms that already penetrate many markets. The impacts on foreign sales per multinational firm are less clear-cut in magnitude across productivity levels in part because falling entry costs directly increase multinational entry to developing economies, but only indirectly encourage their existing production in these markets.     

Profitability of price and quantity strategies in a duopoly with vertical product differentiation

Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry, there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables, price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition (their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game, a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms. Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000     

Structural reform of the electricity industry and economic growth

Using 782 panel data from 34 OECD countries from 1991 to 2013, this study aims to evaluate how structural reform affects GDP growth rate. We use the Barro-type GDP growth rate regression model and apply both fixed and random effect models. Eight structural reform variables are selected: (i) third party access, (ii) wholesale market dummy, (iii) choice of supplier, (iv) private ownership, (v) generation-others separation, (vi) transmission-others separation, (vii) distribution-others separation and (viii) overall vertical separation. Major finding results are as follows: (i) third party access can positively contribute to GDP growth rate, (ii) wholesale market and overall vertical separation might have a small negative effect, and (iii) other variables have no significant effect.     

Trait perceptions influence economic out-group bias: lab and field evidence from Vietnam

Group favoritism is typically directed toward in-group members and against out-group members, but these cross-group effects often vary. Little is known about why group effects on economic choices vary. We use a survey method developed in social psychology to measure stereotyped attitudes of one group toward another. These attitudes are then associated with prosociality in five experimental games (also using an unusual amount of individual-level sociodemographic control). We present evidence from an artificial field experiment of a majority group with high status (Vietnamese) exhibiting no disfavoritism toward a lower-status out-group (Khmer) and typical disfavoritism to a second out-group (Chinese). Both Vietnamese and Chinese groups see the Khmer as warm but incompetent, attitudes which seem to activate empathy rather than contempt. The results suggest that measuring between-group stereotype attitudes can be used to predict the sign of cross-group favoritism in other natural settings.     

Impact of training on the intensification of rice farming: evidence from rainfed areas in Tanzania

Agricultural development is indispensable for poverty reduction and food security in sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA). This study investigates the impact of rice production training in a modified version of the System of Rice Intensification (SRI) on the performance of small‐scale rice farmers in a rainfed area of Tanzania. Utilizing the plot level variation, we employ propensity score matching (PSM) to assess the impact of training on technology adoption, productivity, and profitability. We also estimate a difference‐in‐differences model with plot fixed effects using recall panel data covering the periods before and after training. We found that trainees achieved an average paddy yield of 4.7 tons per hectare and rice profit of 191.5 USD per hectare on the plots where new technologies were adopted, which is higher by about 1.3–1.8 tons and 119–137 USD per hectare than on the other plots. Our study suggests the high potential of transforming favorable rainfed rice growing areas in SSA so as to achieve a rice Green Revolution through training in modern input use and improved agronomic practices.     

The Effects of Uncertain Divestiture as Regulatory Threat

It has been argued that the threat of regulatory intervention affects firm behavior. We investigate the pricing decision of the dominant firm under regulatory threat, considering the probability of intervention as a function of the price. Our focus is on the case where the potential divestiture of the firm serves as a threat of regulatory intervention. It is shown that under certain conditions associated with the marginal expected penalty, the mere threat of divesting a certain portion of the firm’s manufacturing plants leads to a lower price than the actual divestiture of that same portion. Numerical examples illustrate that with relatively small-scale divestiture, the firm’s price under the threat may be lower than that under the actual divestiture, within a relatively broad range of regulator’s attitudes toward intervention.     

Does Aid for Roads Attract Foreign or Domestic Firms? Evidence from Cambodia

Less developed countries have received substantial foreign aid for transport infrastructure, making its quantitative assessment important. To investigate the effect of aid for road infrastructure on the location of foreign and domestic firms, this study employs the first comprehensive census on all business establishments in Cambodia for 2011 and measures the geographical distribution of aid disbursements in roads. Estimating a negative binomial model, we find that aid disbursements in roads have little influence on the entry of foreign and domestic firms across communes. Compared with the aid effect, the location of firms is more strongly influenced by other determinants such as population size, electricity access, and labor supply.     

Applications of Gram–Charlier expansion and bond moments for pricing of interest rates and credit risk

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the powerful and flexible applicability of the Gram–Charlier expansion to pricing of a wide variety of interest rate related products involving interest rate risk and credit risk. In this paper, we develop easily implemented approximations of the prices of several derivatives; swaptions, CMS, CMS options, and vulnerable options. Associated with the default risk, a survival contingent forward measure is constructed.     

On the role of job assignment in a comparison of education systems

Abstract This paper re‐examines how differences in systems for financing education influence GDP by highlighting a neglected function of education policy: it affects the magnitude of gains from job assignment. When more productive jobs demand more skill, privately financed education can increase productivity gains from matching between jobs and skill by increasing the availability of highly educated people. This differs from the standard argument that publicly financed education increases the total amount of human capital by equalizing educational opportunities. It is shown that if job opportunities have large variations in productivity, education policy may face a serious efficiency–equity trade‐off.