The value of the voting right: a study of the Milan Stock Exchange experience

I study the large premium (82 percent) attributed to votingshares on the Milan Stock Exchange. The premium varies accordingto the ownership structure and the concentration of the votingrights, and it can be rationalized in the presence of enormousprivate benefit of control A case study seems to indicate thatin Italy private benefits of control can easily be worth morethan 60 percent of the value of nonvoting equity. A tentativeexplanation for these findings is provided.     

News from the Monopoly Front: Changes in Industrial Concentration, 1992–1997

Comparing concentration ratios between 1992 and 1997 raises difficulties because the 1997 data are arranged according to a new industrial nomenclature. By comparing concentration ratios in industries where the definition did not change, it is possible to make comparisons of changes in concentration between the two years and to document the considerable changes in industrial structure in the manufacturing and retail sectors.     

Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage

We consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a Bertrand-competitive differentiated products downstream industry to: (1) vertically integrate forward, and (2) raise its downstream rivals' costs through non-price activities which we characterize generally as 'sabotage'. We examine these incentives both in the absence and presence of a regulatory constraint on the upstream price. We find that, while an incentive for vertical integration is present regardless of the existence of the regulatory constraint, the incentive for sabotage emerges only in the presence of binding input price regulation. Welfare effects are also explored.     

The Costs and Benefits of Long-Distance Entry: Regulation and Non-Price Discrimination

A primary goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act isto encourage competition in long-distance telephonemarkets. Four years after passage of thislegislation, Bell Operating Companies (``BOCs') havebeen granted permission to offer long-distanceservices in only one state. The regulatory barrier toentry is justified on grounds that the BOCs have theability to discriminate against incumbentlong-distance carriers in the provision of essentialaccess services. We take this premise as given andquantify the critical level of discrimination requiredto offset the positive consumers' surplus gainsassociated with the enhanced competition resultingfrom BOC entry into long-distance markets.