Asset bubbles,labour market frictions and R&D‐based growth

Employing an overlapping generations model of R&D‐based growth with labour market frictions, this paper examines how employment changes induced by labour market frictions influence asset bubbles and long‐run economic growth. Asset bubbles can (cannot) exist when the employment rate is high (low), which leads to higher (lower) economic growth through labour market efficiency. We also explore the steady state and transitional dynamics of bubbles, economic growth and employment. Furthermore, we show that policy or parameter changes with a negative influence on the labour market can lead to a bubble burst.     

Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn?

The impact of incentives on marketing duration is examined for residential real estate using data from the Multiple Listing Service during a real estate downturn. The focus is on incentives offered directly by sellers to potential homebuyers. The evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the selling price during the softened market conditions. Alternatively, incentives are found to have a significant reduction in marketing time, however this is found to be true only for closing costs and not for other incentive classifications. The benefit of reduced expected market time from offering incentives is quickly diminished when the seller initially overprices the listing by a large amount.     

Insider trading and firm-specific return volatility

Roll (J Financ 43:541–566, 1988) argues that firm-specific stock return volatility may result either from informed trading or from noise trading that is unrelated to information. In this paper we provide evidence that insider purchases are inversely related to the idiosyncratic volatility of stocks. We also find that stock idiosyncratic volatilities are generally inversely related to future 6- and 12-month returns. Our results are primarily driven by the timing of insider sales rather than insider purchases. The results are consistent with an information-based explanation of firm-specific return volatility.     

Dual Agent Distortions in Real Estate Transactions

This article investigates price distortions in dual agent real estate transactions. Consistent with the literature, we find that, on average, dual agent has a null effect on sale price. However, dual agent distortions on sale price emerge after controlling for the ownership of the property. Dual agent is associated with a 6.35% price premium on agent‐owned properties, but a 25.10% price discount on government‐owned properties and a 5.14% discount on bank‐owned properties. In addition, market conditions also play an important role in such price distortions.