How Productive Are Economics and Finance PhDs?

This article analyses the research productivity of more than 200 individuals in academe with a PhD in economics and finance from (mostly) Australian universities. We find the number of publications accumulates linearly with experience, while citations increase exponentially, pointing to network effects. Panel regressions indicate: (1) the key role of experience in determining research outcomes; (2) the usual quadratic approach substantially under-estimates the role of diminishing returns to experience; (3) the university where an individual works is mostly unimportant for publications and citations. ‘Prime academic age’, when research has maximum impact, is attained about 11 years after the PhD.     

Valuing farmland with multiple quasi-fixed inputs

This study examines the impact of multiple quasi-fixed assets on the imputed returns to farmland. The results indicate that the presence of additional quasi-fixed assets causes the true shadow value of farmland to deviate from its imputed value. The results also indicate that when the potential existence of multiple quasi-fixed assets is explicitly modelled, the shadow value of farmland approaches reported cash rental values.     

Productivity change in Canadian mining 1957–1979

This paper calculates multifactor productivity trends in seven Canadian mining industries and relates changes in productivity to various factors, including changes in output and factor prices and the decline in the quality of the ore being mined. It is found that productivity decline in mining has been pronounced and tended to predate that of manufacturing by several years. There are indications that the most important factors in the decline have been the fall in mineral grade, contraction of output, increases in interest rates and an apparent decline in the rate of technical innovation.     

Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior

Second chance offers in online marketplaces involve a seller conducting an auction for a single object and then using information from the auction to offer a losing bidder a take-it-or-leave-it price for another unit. We theoretically and experimentally investigate this practice and compare it to two sequential auctions. We show that the equilibrium bidding strategy in the second chance offer mechanism only exists in mixed strategies, and we observe that this mechanism generates more profit for the auctioneer than two sequential auctions. We also observe virtually no rejections of profitable offers in the ultimatum bargaining stage.