In the Twilight Zone Between Veracity and Lying: A Survey on the Perceived Legitimacy of Corporate Deception in Reaction to Ethical Dilemmas

In their effort to attain legitimacy, corporations are tempted to resolve ethical dilemmas that arise from conflicting stakeholder expectations by ambiguous and misleading communication. Such processes of organizational decoupling may in turn threaten corporate legitimacy. Therefore this article explores public acceptance of deceptive corporate practices that range between the poles of veracity and lying: They involve half-truths and concealment but no blatant lies and they neglect veracity only to conform to conflicting ethical values. The analysis builds on the assumption that specific types of corporate deception fulfill protective functions, such as privacy protection, self-defense, and social cohesion, and are therefore socially accepted. Results from an experimental online survey (n = 1,417) indicate that protective functions are ascribed to corporate deception, yet participants show only moderate levels of acceptance and advocacy on behalf of the corporation. Corporate deception is most likely to be perceived as legitimate when it serves privacy protection and when it involves altruistic intentions. These findings point out limits of organizational decoupling and emphasize the need for pluralistic ethics in strategic communication that provide a framework for the resolution of ethical dilemmas under consideration of situational conditions.     

Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.     

Technology foresight using a Delphi approach: a Japanese-German co-operation

This article describes a joint project conducted from 1991 until 1993 by the Japanese National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP) and the German Fraunhofer institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI). Some first outcomes, and different alternatives on how to use the data for trend interpretation and priority setting, are described.
The Japanese Delphi survey is conducted every five years and was first undertaken in 1971. In 1992, NISTEP and ISI agreed on a joint project. About 3000 Japanese experts were asked to answer more than 1000 questions based on 16 different technological areas. With financial aid from the Federal German Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) the Japanese fifth Delphi survey was replicated in Germany. The Japanese questions were translated and more than 1000 German experts responded to the questionnaires and judged the possible technological development within the next 20 to 30 years. The aim of this joint project is to compare the Japanese and the German answers in order to analyse possible differences and to understand the cultural influences on technology assessment.     

EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

To commit in bargaining is crucial: in the ultimatum game with its one‐sided commitment power the ‘proposer’ (almost) receives the whole pie while the ‘responder’ is left with (almost) nothing. When bargaining parties commit simultaneously the symmetric Nash (Econometrica, 1950, vol. 18, pp. 155–162) bargaining solution predicts equal shares. Continuously connecting these two games yields a one‐parameter family of games ( Fischer et al. , Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, pp. 17–33) for which we distinguish two behavioral dispositions, namely (1) neglecting commitment power and (2) reacting to it strategically. Their pay‐off implications define the evolutionary set‐up for which we derive the evolutionarily stable behavioral disposition. Our analysis sheds light on the hypothesis that in experiments participants neglect strategic aspects such as commitment power.     

Current Foresight Activities in France, Spain, and Italy

Recent years have brought a significant revival of public foresight activities in many European countries, including France, Spain, and Italy. The French context is rather specific in the sense that public planning and foresight (prospective) are an old tradition starting in the early post war period, but was progressively abandoned until its international revival during the 1990s. The recent experiences combine a mix of methods including the experimental reproduction of foreign experiences for long-term science and technology foresight (allowing comparisons of the experts’ opinions between countries) and the development of a specific study of critical technologies in the shorter term with the direct aim of orienting and improving the microeconomic strategies in the country.Spain and Italy started their own tests of foresight procedures later. The diffusion of foresight approaches and methods is certainly influenced by cultural proximities between countries of Roman civilization, but the different national settings led to relatively diverse experiences. International comparisons reveal the wide variety of methods and implementations that can be contemplated at present in Europe—a living laboratory of public foresight experiences.     

中国须为下一个经济高峰创造条件

【德国之声9月7日】中国国家领导人最近承认，中国的不安全和不稳定因素在增加。虽然今年第一季度的经济增长仍然达到10．4％，但是国家面临着越来越大的挑战。今年1月，中国就遇到雪灾的严重挑战，5月份又遭遇导致8万多人死亡的大地震。要解决国家面临的经济问题，就必须制定科学的发展政策。给人透露的信息是，中国将告别以前不计代价追求经济增长的政策着眼于可持续增长的经济发展。     

Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Social Contracts for Pareto Improving Pollution Mitigation

We consider, in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality, a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations. Under each contract, agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives. The transfer is financed in a pay-as-you-go manner by the next young generation. Different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum. We show that the existence of a contract which is Pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income. In a steady state with social contracts in each period, the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts. Analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under Nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions, also steady state income and welfare are higher. Delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly: Net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that Pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare. In the second part of the paper, we study a game theoretic setup, taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible. We show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income, there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both Pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy. Social contracts coexist with private savings.     

Neuregelung der Hinzuverdienstmöglichkeiten für Transferbeziehende: keine leichte Aufgabe

In its coalition agreement, the German government proposes a reorganisation of the rules of earned income to be considered as a means test of basic income. In doing so, it takes up a frequently voiced criticism of the design of the basic income support for job-seekers under Book II of the Social Code. In recent years, researchers have called for a strengthening of (monetary) incentives to work, especially to take up employment with higher weekly working hours. In this paper, we summarise potential effects of such a reform on labour supply, the income distribution and the government budget in the context of a complex welfare system characterised by a high level of benefit non-take-up.

     

The value relevance of SAM's corporate sustainability ranking and GRI sustainability reporting in the European stock markets

This paper investigates whether relative corporate sustainability as measured by the SAM sustainability ranking and sustainability reporting in terms of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) application levels are associated with a higher market valuation. We conduct a value relevance study for the 600 largest European companies with the Feltham and Ohlson valuation model as a reference point. Our results indicate that for the observation period 2001 to 2011, the association between corporate sustainability and market value is positive. The empirical evidence of a positive relationship between GRI reporting and market value is statistically significant in some but not all of the model specifications. We find no evidence of interaction between the value relevance of corporate sustainability and sustainability reporting, nor do we find any positive effect of external assurance on the capital market perception of GRI application levels. Our results support the notion that conducting business in accordance with ethical norms is also a shareholder value‐increasing business strategy. However, it is not possible to verify the information given in sustainability reports through external assurance.