OPEC and political considerations when deciding on oil extraction

Two oil price shocks changed the pattern of cheap oil. The first was the Arab embargo on oil exports in 1973. Oil prices rose five fold. In 1978, the second was the fall of Shah Iran. Prices soared to $80–$100 a barrel in today’s prices. In 1960, OPEC was established and since then it has been a considerable political and economic force in the oil market. Two thirds of the world’s oil reserves belong to OPEC members. OPEC is accused of being responsible for most of the price increases due to their production cuts and market power. This paper provides a general framework to examine the role of OPEC in affecting oil prices through the extracted quantities. A mathematical model is developed to explore the objective function of OPEC, which includes economic and political considerations. The idea is that OPEC members consider both the political support of their citizens and profits when determining oil extraction rates. This support is represented by a “harm function” which was added to the objective function of OPEC. The solution of the model lends some support for inclusion of this harm function, through which OPEC benefits from the cuts in production aimed at harming the western countries. For this harm function to be meaningful empirically, OPEC members should have a high harm indicator, α_t. With high harm indicator values, OPEC harms itself financially. The results suggest that OPEC appears to be accepting considerable monetary setbacks to appease its citizens’ taste for harming the West. At different discount rates, the monetary losses range from about 10–20%. Solving the mathematical model required estimation of the residual demand that OPEC faces plus the cost function that applies to OPEC production. This paper reports the results of these estimations.     

Public Subsidies to Business: An International Comparison

The paper compares the design and outcome of public subsidies to business across a number of industrialized countries. The comparison of the amount of subsidies shows that the share of GDP devoted to total public support is markedly lower in the USA than in Europe but the share of GDP devoted to support that improves economic performance is comparable. Implementing public support follows two models. The first model (Anglo-Saxon) model is primarily “soft” in nature and decentralized. The second model is more interventionist and centralized. The former model seems to perform better especially in term of science and technology. However, the impact of public support policies remains seriously under-researched and more research is crucially needed to draw firm conclusions.     

Does economic growth benefit the poor? The role of institutions and religions

This paper seeks to explain the difference across countries of the impact of national growth on the growth of the income of the poor. Traditionally, studies attempting to explain such differences investigate only the impact of some additional variables on the income level of the poor. Here, we introduce interaction terms to explain the change in the elasticity of income of the poor to national income. We focus on the role of formal and informal institutions and religions; variables which have rarely been considered in this context. The results show that only formal institutions (i.e., Resistance to corruption) and, to some extent, informal institutions (i.e., Trust all) explain the differences. Religion has no impact. The findings also show that improvements in the Resistance to corruption benefits the extremely poor more than the poor.