The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse

We examine the role that belief, network externality, and information aggregation play in inefficient market collapses. After receiving consecutive negative shocks, some ex-ante identical Bayesian agents will be discouraged about the unknown state of the market they invest; therefore, they will stop investing. This decision will have two effects: first, it will cause agents to aggregate information through social/observational learning; second, it will decrease the network externality effect. We show that there might be an inefficient market collapse if the externality effect diminishes too much, and the cost of re-entry to the market is too high. We also analyze the effects of strategic delay and experimentation on the exit decision of the agents. I especially thank Thomas D. Jeitschko, Matthew Mitchell, B. Ravikumar Ted Temzelides. I also thank anonymous referees, an associate editor, John Conlon, Larry Samuelson, Troy Tassier, Stephen Williamson, and seminar participants of the University of Saskatchewan, Georgia Tech, Concordia University, University of Manitoba, Iowa Alumni Workshop, Midwest Economic Theory Conferences held at Indiana Bloomington, and Notre Dame, and 1st International Conference on Business, Management and Economics organized by Yasar University.     

Aid Effectiveness,Debt Relief and Public Finance Response: Evidence from a Panel of HIPC Countries

Substantial amounts of debt relief have been granted to a set of low-income countries, as an alternative aid modality. Although the theoretical case for debt relief is firmly established, only empirical analysis can show whether debt relief is indeed a (more) effective mode of aid delivery. We investigate the linkages between debt relief and other fiscal variables such as current expenditure, government investment, taxation and domestic borrowing, in comparison to the effects of grants and concessional loans. We find that the fiscal impact of HIPC debt relief follows fairly complex dynamics. For example, debt relief initially reduces government investment, but the effect becomes positive after two years, well outperforming other modes of aid delivery. JEL no. F34, F35, O11, O19     

Bankruptcy and firm finance

This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects firm finance. The court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoretical and quantitative characterization of the effect of these enforcement parameters on the contract loan rate, the default probability and welfare. We analyze agents’ incentive to default and pursue bankruptcy and show that when the constraints that govern these decisions bind, the enforcement parameters can have a sharply non-linear effect on finance. We also compute the welfare losses of “poor institutions” and show that they are non-trivial. The results provide guidance on when models which abstract from enforcement provide good approximations and when they do not.      

Reconfiguration of the conceptual landscape: a tribute to the service logic of Richard Normann

This article is a tribute to the late Richard Normann, whose call for a “service logic” (Normann, Reframing Business: When the Map Changes the Landscape, Wiley, Chichester, p. 99, 2001) both parallels and enriches service-dominant (S-D) logic (Vargo and Lusch, J. Mark, 68:1–17, 2004a). Like Vargo and Lusch, Normann shifted the focus of the offering from an output to a process of value creation and perceived the firm as an organizer of this process, with the customer as a co-producer, rather than a receiver of value. He also argued that offerings are “frozen knowledge,” similar to Vargo and Lusch’s contention that the basis of exchange is applied operant resources (service) and suggested that the ‘dematerialization’ of resources increases their ‘liquidity’, which allows increased “density” for value creation. Thus, he suggested that firms need to “reframe business”—rethink the logic of value creation—to reveal opportunities in reconfiguring the value constellations of which they are part. This tribute explores these and other similarities and differences between Normann’s work and the evolving S-D logic.     

Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: an application to universities

Academics produce science and teaching which requires specific unobservable characteristics. Applying the multi-dimensional screening methodology of Armstrong and Rochet (European Economic Review, 43, 959–979, 1999), it is shown that universities optimally propose a menu of contracts to academics: high powered incentives for those who are productive and lower ones for other agents. In some cases, the university can write a single contract for both tasks to increase production. An academic is then expected to produce more teaching to show that she likes science, which is an argument to produce science and teaching in a single institution: universities. These results are discussed in light of economic, sociological and educational literature.