An Integrative Framework for Measuring the Extent to which Organizational Variables Influence the Success of Process Improvement Programmes

abstract    Studies on the three types of process improvement programmes (Continuous Improvement, Reengineering and Benchmarking) have appeared many times in the literature. These studies suggest that certain organizational variables act as enablers and their presence or absence can significantly influence success rates. Such studies have tended to examine companies where a single programme has been implemented. In contrast, this paper examines a sample of companies who have experienced all three programmes. Our aim is to compare and contrast each programme's impact on firm performance and identify which organizational variables are common and which are programme-specific enablers of success. We build and test an integrative framework to support our analysis. Our study found that: (1) Reengineering delivered the greatest impact on performance; (2) executive commitment was needed to make this happen; (3) strategic alignment was the major influence on the success rate of Reengineering and Continuous Improvement programmes; and (4) employee empowerment was necessary for each programme to work effectively.     

Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information

We consider a model of an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous firms and products where neither the cost nor the demand functions are common knowledge. Instead, each firm only has some vague ideas about the price strategies adopted by its competitors which is modelled by a fuzzy set. In analogy to the notion of an "equilibrium of actions and beliefs" we define and characterize a generalized Nash-equilibrium and show its existence under general conditions. Furthermore, the impact of the fuzzy information on the equilibrium outcome is analyzed by means of a comparative static analysis within a particular model framework.Received: 28 May 2002, Accepted: 25 December 2002, JEL Classification: D43, D80, L13We wish to thank Bernhard F. Arnold, the editor Murat Sertel , and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Of course, we are responsible for all remaining errors.     

Outsourcing and trade in a spatial world

This paper provides an analysis of outsourcing and trade in a spatial model à la Hotelling. In this setting, we discuss the trade-off between transport-cost-related disadvantages and outsourcing-related production cost advantages of a large economy and we investigate how the existence of national transport costs influences both the structure of industrial production and the pattern of final goods trade. In addition, the model gives a rich picture of the possible welfare effects of trade liberalization. In particular, we show that a final goods exporting country definitely gains from economic integration, while a final goods importing country may lose. Finally, when lowering domestic outsourcing activities, trade liberalization may reduce world welfare, even if pro-competitive effects lead to a decline in consumer prices.     

Strategic profiles and performance: An empirical test of select key propositions

Competing theories on internal orientation versus external orientation are examined. The relevant theories are amalgamated and condensed into a number of competing propositions that are empirically tested. The findings suggest that the internally oriented businesses as well as the externally oriented businesses underperform the efficient, marketing oriented businesses.     

Correction to: Earnings announcement return extrapolation

Review of Accounting Studies - A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09605-9     

Poverty in Palanpur

The meaning and identification of poverty are examined usingthree indicators of standard of living in the North Indian villageof Palanpur. The first is intended as a measure of "apparentprosperity" based on the personal assessments of investigatorsafter intensive field work in the village over the full agriculturalyear 1983–84. The other two are income in 1983–84,and a measure of permanent income obtained by averaging incomesfrom four surveys conducted over a twenty-six-year interval.A comparison of these three indicators shows that income measuredin any one year may give a misleading impression of the incidenceof poverty. The risk of poverty for households is calculated.Vulnerability is high among low-caste households and those whichare involved in agricultural labor. Categories, however, arenot homogeneous; for example, whereas the landless and widowsare more likely to be poor, some of such households are quitewell off. It is argued that poverty in a good agricultural yearis a better indicator of sustained poverty than poverty in abad year. Occupational mobility out of agricultural labor islow, and changes in the distribution of land are largely accountedfor by demographic processes such as household splits.     

A BUREAUCRAT'S PROCUREMENT STRATEGY: BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND RATIONING

ABSTRACT ** :  We investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. The bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

Stable matchings and preferences of couples

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.     

Characterizing Pareto Improvements in an Interdependent Demand System

Interdependent preferences generally imply Pareto inefficiency. For a general demand system, we provide a characterization of Pareto improvements. For a prominent parametric specification, the Linear Expenditure System, we characterize in detail the welfare loss associated with interdependent preferences. Using an estimated empirical model of this kind, we calculate the compensating variation corresponding to the welfare loss.