Cooperation and Competition in the Context of Organic and Mechanic Worldviews – A Theoretical and Case based Discussion

In this study we argue that there is an interconnection between; the mechanistic worldview and competition, and the organic worldview and cooperation. To illustrate our main thesis we introduce two cases; first, Max Havelaar, a paradigmatic case of how business might function in an economy based upon solidarity and sustainability. Second, TINE, a Norwegian grocery corporation engaged in collusion in order to force a small competitor out of the market. On the one hand, in order to encourage market behaviour that integrates economic, societal and environmental values we find that transparent cooperation within a context of an organic worldview takes care of important intrinsic as well as instrumental values. On the other hand, we find evidence for asserting that cooperation based upon a mechanistic worldview, typically leads to group egotistical consequences undermining the long term common good.     

V Chemnitz East Forum 21–23 March 2001 "Human Resource Management in Transition"

Call for Papers

V Chemnitz East Forum 21–23 March 2001 "Human Resource Management in Transition"     

How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social,Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof.     

Habilitation Friedrich Krotz

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Fairness and the employment contract: North American regions versus Germany

Substantial evidence shows that North Americans are generallymore accepting of the market than Europeans and attribute marketoutcomes to a larger degree to effort or skill. Thus, NorthAmericans might be more accepting of layoffs and pay cuts thanGermans, and Germans might be more sensitive to the proceduresand conditions under which pay cuts and layoffs occur. The empiricalresults from our quasi-experiment are largely in line with thesehypotheses. The results may help to explain and be explainedby the different labour market institutions in the differentregions.     

Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

Does Improved Environmental Policy Enhance Economic Growth?

The environmental impacts on an economy is studied over time using endogenous growth theory. Externalities from the environment on production are central in the analysis, and we examine whether an optimal path realizes more rapid economic growth. The paper focuses mainly on developing countries, where production is largely influenced by the environmental quality. The result of the analysis indicates that the economic growth rate may not depend on the internalization of the environmental externality, but rather on the internalization of the human capital externality. The level of economic activity, however, generally seems to depend on the internalization of both externalities.     

Can a Wealthy Economy Gain from an EU Membership? Adjustment Costs and Long Term Welfare Effects of Full Integration—The Norwegian Case

We employ a large scale macroeconometric model to study adjustment problems and long term welfare effects of a Norwegian EU-membership. Accession costs depend significantly on the country's level of GDP, the size of its agricultural sector and tariff and VAT revenues as these elements determine the net membership contribution. Without the transfers, integrating the economy into EU generates a small welfare gain. This result is strongly affected by a long period with under-utilisation of resources. With the net contribution included, we identify a welfare loss. This is especially so if fiscal policy is changed to maintain the public sector budgetary balance.     

Dynamic equilibrium and the structure of premiums in a reinsurance market

In this paper we present an economic equilibrium analysis of a reinsurance market. The continuous-time model contains the principal components of uncertainty; about the time instants at which accidents take place, and about claim sizes given that accidents have occurred. We give sufficient conditions on preferences for a general equilibrium to exist, with a Pareto optimal allocation, and derive the premium functional via a representative agent pricing theory. The marginal utility process of the reinsurance market is represented by the density process for random measures, which opens up for numerous applications to premium calculations, some of which are presented in the last section. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations of individual dynamic optimization are established for proportional treaties, and the term structure of interest rates is found in this reinsurance syndicate. The paper attempts to reach a synthesis between the classical actuarial risk theory of insurance, in which virtually no economic reasoning takes place but where the net reserve is represented by a stochastic process, and the theory of equilibrium price formation at the heart of the economics of uncertainty.