The impact of work‐life programs on firm productivity

This research examined the adoption of work‐life programs and the impact of work‐life programs on firm productivity. Human resource executives in a national sample of 658 organizations provided survey data on firm characteristics and work‐life programs. In these 658 organizations, the percentage of professionals and the percentage of women employed were positively related to the development of more extensive work‐life programs. Productivity data were obtained from CD Disclosure for 195 public, for‐profit firms. Significant interaction effects indicated that in these 195 firms work‐life programs had a stronger positive impact on productivity when women comprised a larger percentage of the workforce and when a higher percentage of professionals were employed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vorschläge zur wirksamen Verschuldungsbegrenzung der Länder

Ein Themenschwerpunkt bei den Beratungen der Kommission zur F?deralismusreform II ist der Umgang mit der hohen Schuldenlast deutscher Gebietsk?rperschaften. Welche L?sungskonzepte wurden vorgeschlagen? Wie sind die Reformoptionen im Einzelnen ausgestaltet? Welche verfassungsrechtlichen Konsequenzen sind mit den Vorschl?gen verbunden? Prof. Dr. Kai A. Konrad, 46, ist Direktor der Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung am Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung und Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Freien Universit?t Berlin.     

The negotiations on a common fund

The developing countries regard the “Common Fund“ for the financing of the Integrated Programme for Commodities as the symbol of a new and more equitable International Economic Order. In the industrialized countries, on the other side, many people see in it a symbol of the attempt to replace the liberal system of the world economy by worldwide dirigisme. Is there a prospect of agreement?     

Budgetdefizite und Finanzierungsüberschüsse

In den Stabilit?ts- und Wachstumspakt ist die 3%-Defizitgrenze für den Staatshaushalt vor allem deshalb eingebaut worden, weil eine zu hohe Beanspruchung des gemeinsamen Kapitalmarktes der Eurozone verhindert werden sollte. Welche Erkenntnisse lassen sich zur tats?chlichen Inanspruchnahme des Kapitalmarktes aus den Finanzierungssalden der Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung gewinnen? Wie ist bei solch einer Betrachtung das Argument der Generationengerechtigkeit zu beurteilen? Welche Folgen h?tte gegenw?rtig eine Haushaltskonsolidierung?     

The EU and Turkey—Economic Effects of Turkey’s Full Membership

Since October 2005 the EU and Turkey have been negotiating the accession of Turkey to the EU. In June 2006 they reached agreement on the provisional closure of the “science and research” chapter, a matter which was relatively easy to handle. Thirty-four chapters remain to be negotiated, indicating that the path to Turkey’s full membership will be a long one. What are the main economic challenges facing both Turkey and the EU?     

Vom „Aufbau Ost“ zur Föderalismusreform?

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Effective teaching,student engagement and student satisfaction during the Covid-19 pandemic: Evidence from business students' qualitative survey evaluations

We investigate the influence of unanticipated prolonged disruption on effective teaching, student engagement and student satisfaction during campus lockdown due to COVID-19. Qualitative comments provided by undergraduate business students in the university end-of-semester survey were analysed using a variety of methods, including sentiment analysis. Our findings indicate that effective teaching through the characteristics of the instructor, can lead to enhanced student engagement and higher levels of student satisfaction in an emergency remote teaching environment. Our findings highlight the critical role of the instructor in providing cognitive and affective support to students, along with clear communication, during times of substantial change.     

Preemption contests between groups

We consider a preemption game between competing groups; firms lobbying individually for their groups' interests provide an empirical example. Among symmetric groups, the first firm to take action bears an (unobserved) cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group. In equilibrium, the firm with the lowest cost takes action, but with delay. More competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay. Firms in larger groups wait longer, but group action can occur earlier, as the probability of a low-cost firm is higher. Asymmetries in group size or strength of externalities also matter.